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A NEW LOOK AT DEAD HAND PROVISIONS IN POISON PILLS: 
ARE THEY PER SE INVALID AFTER TOLL BROTHERS AND 
QUICKTURN? 
 In the ever-evolving field of corporate takeover jurisprudence, the defensive 
mechanism that has mutated more rapidly than others, and has prompted the 
most widespread debate, is the “poison pill” rights plan.  Since making its legal 
debut in 1985, the story of the poison pill has been a work-in-progress, with 
each variation and innovation generating new litigation and occasions for 
judicial opinion writing.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder rights plans, often called poison pills,2 were developed during 
the corporate takeover boom of the 1980s and are employed by target 
companies to combat hostile3 tender offers4 made by corporate raiders.5  
 
 1. Noted by Vice Chancellor Jack Jacobs of the Court of Chancery of Delaware in his 
recent opinion in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 27 
(Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.  Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 
A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 2. A poison pill, in its basic form, is described as “a distribution to stockholders of a right 
which acquires significant economic value upon the occurrence of specified events involving a 
non-board-approved acquisition of a significant ownership position in the company.” 1 ARTHUR 
FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE § 5.01[B][1], at 5-6 (5th ed. 
Supp. 1997).  The economic value normally consists of an entitlement to purchase securities from 
the target company or from the raider at a substantial discount and excludes participation of the 
raider.  Id. 
 3. “Hostile” refers to those takeovers initiated by the acquiring company that are actively 
opposed by a target company’s board of directors, in contrast to “friendly” or “uncontested” 
takeovers which are supported or approved by the board of the target company.  Robert A. 
Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the 
Counterproductive Effect of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 389, 393 
(1989). 
 4. The tender offer is one of several corporate techniques used to acquire control of a target 
company in an effort to go around the management of a target company that resists a proposed 
acquisition.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1468 (6th ed. 1990).  It is not defined by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, but it  usually involves a publicly announced offer for any or all of 
the shares of a target company at a premium over the prevailing market price, with fixed terms; 
the offer is normally valid for a limited period and is often contingent on the tender of a specified 
minimum number of shares; in the case of a partial bid, it is subject to a fixed maximum number 
of shares.  Id.  The offer is made by the acquiring company directly to the stockholders of the 
target company and is communicated to them by means of newspaper advertisements and, if the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
224 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:223 
Invented by Martin Lipton of the law firm of Wachtel, Lipton, Rosen & Katz 
in 1984,6 and upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. Household 
International, Inc.7 in 1985, poison pills have become one of the most widely 
used defensive devices8 and have proven to be one of the most effective in 
enhancing shareholder value.9  To date, more than 2500 companies have 
adopted poison pills of some sort.10  Poison pills have become “a pervasive 
aspect of the U.S. corporate landscape.”11 
The takeover frenzy in the 1980s and the substantial merger and 
acquisition activities commencing in the mid-1990s12 have caused companies 
to look continuously for ways to protect themselves from the evolving tactics 
of hostile bidders.13  Consequently, poison pills have continued to mutate 
rapidly and inventively.14  The most recent innovations are the so-called “dead 
hand” poison pill and its variation the “no-hand” poison pill discussed below. 
Widespread adoption of poison pills by target companies has greatly 
enhanced target companies’ abilities to defeat hostile bidders’ naked tender 
offers; in turn, hostile bidders have used more aggressive tactics.15  One such 
tactic is the tender offer combined with a proxy contest or consent solicitation 
to replace the incumbent board of the target.  The replacement of the board is 
 
acquiring company can obtain the shareholders list, by a general mailing to all shareholders, with 
a view to acquiring control of the target company.  Id. 
 5. Shawn C. Lese, Preventing Control from the Grave: A Proposal for Judicial Treatment 
of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2175, 2175 (1996). 
 6. Babatunde M. Animashaun, Poison Pill: Corporate Anti-Takeover Defensive Plan and 
the Directors’ Responsibilities in Responding to Takeover Bids, 18 S.U. L. REV. 171, 176 (1991). 
 7. 500 A.2d 1345 (Del. 1985). 
 8. After their debut in 1984, poison pills became especially prevalent by 1988.  Kenneth J. 
Bialkin & Robert G. Wray, Legal Developments: Poison Pills, M&A LAW., May 1998, at 12.  
Substantial merger and acquisition activities in the mid-1990s led to another large wave of pill 
introduction.  This wave is also attributable to renewal of rights plans adopted in the mid-1980’s 
which hit their 10 year expiration point in mid-1990s.  For example, they were adopted at a rate 
of about two per day in 1997.  Martin Lipton, Poison Pills Update, M&A LAW., Jul./Aug. 1997, 
at 3. 
 9. A recent study was conducted by Georgeson & Company Inc., analyzing takeover data 
between 1992 and 1996 to determine the impact of poison pills on shareholder value.  Jamil 
Aboumeri, Mergers & Acquisitions: Poison Pills and Shareholder Value / 1992-1996, 
GEORGESON RESEARCH, Nov. 1997, at 1.  This study revealed that, on average, those target 
companies that had poison pills in place were paid premiums 26% higher than premiums paid to 
target companies not having poison pills.  Id.  This finding was also consistent with earlier studies 
done by Georgeson.  Id. 
 10. Lipton, supra note 8, at 3. 
 11. Bialkin & Wray, supra note 8, at 12. 
 12. Dennis J. Block et al., Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response to 
Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 623, 623 (1997). 
 13. Lese, supra note 5, at 2187. 
 14. Id. at 2208. 
 15. Id. at 2183. 
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intended to lead to removal of the pill so that the tender offer can proceed.16  In 
response, target companies have sought to strengthen the defensive attributes 
of the poison pill through the “dead hand” provision.17  Thus, the pill is known 
as the dead hand pill.  The dead hand feature allows the pill to be redeemed 
only by the “continuing directors,” that is, the directors who were in office 
when the pill was adopted or their approved successors.18  A prominent 
variation of the dead hand provision is the so-called “no hand” provision.  The 
no hand feature prohibits any directors (whether the incumbent or continuing 
directors or the hostile bidder’s newly elected slate) from redeeming the pill 
for a limited period of time, for example, six months.19  Dead hand provisions 
were included in many pills adopted in the early to mid-1990s20 to combat the 
increasingly common strategy of hostile bidders, that is, combining a tender 
offer with a proxy contest or consent solicitation.21 
As Vice Chancellor Jacobs noted in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn 
Design Systems, Inc.,22 each variation and innovation generates new 
litigation.23  The dead hand poison pill is no exception.  The validity of the 
dead hand feature has been questioned and challenged on many legal grounds, 
including claims that it violates state corporate statutes and that its use involves 
a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties.24  Scholars and commentators have 
written articles regarding these challenges.25  Surprisingly, prior to Carmody v. 
Toll Brothers, Inc.,26 few courts had spoken on the validity of the dead hand 
feature.  In fact, only two courts applying New York law and Georgia law, 
respectively, had squarely addressed the dead hand feature.  They reached 
 
 16. Id. at 2183-84, 2187. 
 17. Bialkin & Wray, supra note 8, at 12. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Lese, supra note 5, at 2210. 
 20. JOY M. BRYAN, CHARLES E. SIMON & CO., CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: 
THE POISON PILL DEVICE Intro.-1 (1999 ed.). 
 21. Lese, supra note 5, at 2187-89. 
 22. 728 A.2d 25, aff’d on other grounds sub nom.  Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 
721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 23. Id. at 27. 
 24. Lese, supra note 5, at 2177. 
 25. See, e.g., Lese, supra note 5, at 2175; Bialkin & Wray, supra note 8, at 12; Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, “Just Say Never?”  Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills and Shareholder Adopted By-Laws: An 
Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 531 (1997); Daniel A. Neff, The Impact of 
State Statutes and Continuing Director Rights Plans, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 663, 671 (1997); 
Meredith M. Brown & William D. Regner, Shareholder Rights Plans: Recent Toxopharmological 
Developments, 11 NO. 10 INSIGHTS 2, 3 (1997); John Elofson, Should Dead Hand Poison Pills Be 
Sent to an Early Grave? 25 SEC. REG. L.J. 303, 303 (1997). 
 26. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).  The decision was handed down by the Delaware 
Chancery Court on July 24, 1998.  This is the first Delaware court opinion that squarely 
addressed the dead hand feature.  Id. 
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opposite holdings.27  The two cases are Bank of New York v. Irving Bank 
Corp.28 and Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc.29  This dearth of 
judicial opinions on the dead hand poison pill contrasts sharply with the 
plethora of cases treating the “ordinary” poison pill.30 
Ascertaining the validity of the dead hand provisions in poison pills is even 
more critical at this juncture because most poison pills adopted in the 1980’s 
are continuing to approach their expiration dates.31  Companies are considering 
adopting new pills, or renewing or amending old pills.32  The uncertainty 
regarding the validity of the dead hand feature substantially affects their 
strategic planning in pill adoption or renewal.  In addition, the lack of both 
guidance and authoritative decisions has generated speculation among scholars 
and commentators,33 and has placed the dead hand poison pill in the spotlight. 
Recently, the validity of dead hand provisions in poison pills was reviewed 
by the Delaware courts in Carmody v. Toll Brothers34 and Quickturn Design 
Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro.35  Dead hand provisions have also been reviewed 
under Pennsylvania law in AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc.36  The holdings in 
these decisions were not in agreement.37  In the Delaware courts, the first 
challenge of the dead hand and no hand features ended with victory for 
opponents of these features.38  In contrast, a federal court in Pennsylvania 
issued an opinion, which represents a victory for those in the opposite camp.39  
These most recent cases have gained rapt attention from the corporate 
 
 27. See Bank of New York v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) 
(holding that the dead hand pills are invalid under New York law).  But cf. Invacare Corp. v. 
Healthdyne Technologies, Inc. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (D.C.N. Ga. 1997) (upholding the validity of 
the dead hand pills under Georgia law). 
 28. 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (invalidating the dead hand pill under New York 
law). 
 29. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (upholding the validity of the dead hand pill under 
Georgia law). 
 30. See cases cited infra notes 125, 136-37. 
 31. Typically, poison pills are given limited lives of 10 years.  Bialkin and Wray, supra note 
8, at 12. 
 32. JOY M. BRYAN, CHARLES E. SIMON & COMPANY, CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER 
DEFENSES: THE POISON PILL DEVICE Intro-1 (1998 ed.). 
 33. See sources cited supra note 25. 
 34. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).  This is the first Delaware court opinion that squarely 
addressed the dead hand poison pill. 
 35. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), aff’g on other grounds Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn 
Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998) (invalidating the no hand feature of a poison pill 
under Delaware law). 
 36. Civ. A. Nos. 98-4405, 98-4058, and 98-4109, 1998 WL 778348, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 
1998) (upholding the validity of the no hand pill under Pennsylvania law). 
 37. See infra Parts III.C, III.D. 
 38. See infra Part III.C. 
 39. See infra Part III.D. 
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community and have afforded much needed guidance, though some questions 
remain open.40 
Against this background, this Comment will examine the development of 
the dead hand provision and its variations, challenges to the validity of the 
dead hand feature, and judicial review of this feature.  This Comment will 
conclude that dead hand provisions in poison pills are per se invalid under 
Delaware law in the absence of provisions to the contrary stated in the 
certificate of incorporation.  This was the finding of the Delaware Supreme 
Court in its New Year’s Eve decision in Quickturn.  Nevertheless, this 
Comment takes the position that Toll Brothers and Quickturn do not render 
every dead hand poison pill per se invalid, because each state has its own 
corporate statutes.  Indeed, some states’ corporate statutes differ substantially 
from Delaware’s.  For some non-Delaware corporations, the dead hand poison 
pill, especially one of limited duration, may continue to be one of the most 
effective defensive measures available to fend off a hostile bidder’s tender 
offer joined with a proxy contest.  This Comment will also explore alternative 
defensive measures available to Delaware corporations in light of the 
unavailability of the dead hand poison pill to them and discuss the aftermath of 
these recent cases for non-Delaware corporations. 
Section II of this Comment examines the origin and attributes of the poison 
pill and its variations, challenges to its validity, the legal standard governing 
the use of the poison pill as an anti-takeover defensive measure, recent 
statutory development, and judicial review of the adoption, use, and 
redemption of the poison pill.  This section also provides a historical 
background concerning the development of dead hand provisions in poison 
pills and discusses the controversy surrounding the dead hand feature.  Section 
III analyzes how courts of different jurisdictions have reviewed the dead hand 
provision and its variations, with an emphasis on the way in which their 
reasoning compares and contrasts with that of the Toll Brothers and Quickturn 
courts.  Section IV then discusses the likely impact of these recent rulings on 
corporate governance and suggests alternative anti-takeover measures for 
Delaware corporations to fend off the perceived coercion arising from the joint 
tender offer and proxy contest without running afoul of Toll Brothers and 
Quickturn.  Finally, this section also discusses legal developments after these 
cases and legal implications of the recent rulings for corporations incorporated 
elsewhere. 
 
 40. See, e.g., Herbert Henryson II, Is Unocal Alive and Well in Pennsylvania?  M&A LAW., 
Mar. 1999, at 16; Kevin G. Abrams & J. Travis Laster, A Mentor’s Teachings: Lessons and 
Implications of the Delaware Dead Hand Decisions, M&A LAW., Feb. 1999, at 1; Delaware 
Supreme Court Rules That Delayed Redemption Poison Pill Unlawfully Constrains Director’s 
Discretion, 21 BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REPORTER 1188 (1999). 
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II.  HISTORY 
A. Historical Background of the Poison Pill 
1. Origin and Development of the Poison Pill As an Anti-Hostile-
Takeover Measure 
As corporate takeovers accelerated in the mid-1980s, hostile bidders 
developed a variety of takeover tactics to acquire target companies, including 
the bear hug;41 the creeping tender offer;42 the front-end loaded, two-tiered 
tender offer;43 and other devices.44  As takeover tactics evolved and increased 
in number and complexity, so did defensive measures employed by target 
companies to ward off hostile bids.  Additional colorful names referring to 
these defensive measures have been invoked in practice and legal literature, 
including white knights,45 shark repellents,46 lock-up options,47 sales of crown 
jewels,48 and other wonderful devices.49 
 
 41. A “bear hug” refers to a takeover attempt consisting of a proposal made to the directors 
of a target company.  It normally takes the form of a communication, typically a letter, in which a 
bidder proposes to enter into a negotiated transaction with the target company, accompanied by 
the implicit or explicit threat of a hostile takeover attempt if the bidder’s offer is rejected.  
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1142 (5th ed. 1994). 
 42. A “creeping tender offer” is a gradual accumulation of a substantial percentage of the 
stock of the target company through a series of open market or privately negotiated purchases.  
Id. 
 43. A “front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer” is a two-step transaction: a higher offering 
price in the tender offer, which constitutes the first step, and a lower offering price in the 
subsequent merger, which constitutes the second step.  The purpose is to encourage shareholders 
of a target company to tender their shares in the first step for fear that they will receive a lower 
price in the second step if they hold onto their stock.  Lese, supra note 5, at 2184. 
 44. Id. 
 45. A “white knight” refers to a “friendly” party to whom a target company turns as an 
alternative to a hostile offeror.  The white knight normally makes a competing offer.  HAMILTON, 
supra note 41, at 1142. 
 46. “Shark repellents” refer to provisions inserted in the articles of incorporation or other 
governing documents of a potential target company that are intended to make the target less 
attractive or more difficult to be taken over.  Id. at 1143.  For example, shark repellents might 
include provisions establishing a classified board.  Id. 
 47. A “lock-up” refers to a transaction entered into between a target company and a white 
knight in an effort to give the white knight a tactical advantage in making a bid in competition 
with a hostile bidder.  Id.  A lock-up will often involve either the sale of the stock of the target 
company or the issuance of an option to purchase such stock from either the target company or 
one of more of its major shareholders.  Id.  A lock-up may also involve an agreement by the target 
or a certain number of its shareholders to support the white knight’s offer, not to seek other 
offers, or not to tender into any other offers.  Id. 
 48. A “crown jewel” refers to the most prized or particularly significant portion of a target 
company’s assets, which makes the company an attractive takeover target.  Id.  The sale of a 
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Among the above-mentioned takeover tactics, some place shareholders 
(especially individual shareholders) at a disadvantage.  For example, the front-
end loaded, two-tiered tender offer is one such tactic.  Typically it operates as 
follows: the raider offers to buy only a portion of a target company’s stock; 
later, a merger follows in which the remaining shareholders of the target 
company receive a lower price than that offered initially.50  As a result, this 
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer may stampede shareholders of the 
target company into tendering their shares to the raider for fear of being left 
behind.51 
In response, many companies found it desirable to consider additional 
protective measures, leading to the creation and adoption of the rights plan or 
“poison pill” as defined below.52  The purpose of the pill is to encourage 
raiders to negotiate with the target board to acquire the company rather than 
making the acquisition through a tender offer or other unilateral action.53  
Because of the pill, the target board gains additional bargaining power against 
a bidder in negotiating a transaction in the best interest of all target 
shareholders. 
2. Key Features of the Poison Pill 
Although there are many variations as discussed below in detail, poison 
pills all share some common key features.  One key feature is that when a 
“triggering event” occurs, the pill entitles all shareholders of the target 
company, other than the hostile bidder, to purchase stock of the target 
company or that of the bidder at a substantial discount compared to the then-
current market price.54  An exercise of this right results in a severe dilution of 
the hostile bidder’s holdings.55  The dilution is so substantial that hostile 
bidders are forced to negotiate with the target board instead of triggering the 
 
crown jewel is to discourage a hostile bid by subjecting the bidder to the risk that even if its bid is 
successful, it will gain control of a target company which has been stripped of its crown jewels.  
Id. 
 49. Lese, supra note 5, at 2178 n.17 (citing 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, 
TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS §§ 6.03[1]-6.03[3], at 6-28 to 6-57; 6.60[4][k], at 6-238; 6.06[5][a], 
at 6-239 to 6-241; and 6.06[3], at 6-128 to 6-129 (1995)). 
 50. Id. at 2184-85.  To illustrate, the bidder might offer to buy 51% of the outstanding 
common stock of the target company at $120 per share in cash; however, upon acquiring control 
of the target company, the bidder will offer to buy the remaining shares at only $80 per share. 
 51. Id. at 2185. 
 52. For a definition of the poison pill, see infra text accompanying notes 63-65. 
 53. Lese, supra note 5, at 2185. 
 54. Bialkin & Wray, supra note 8, at 12; see also F. Dean Copeland, Advance Planning and 
Structural Defenses for Financial Institutions, in FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 1997, at 685, 703 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-
7179, 1997). 
 55. Id. 
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pill since typically the board is the only body entitled to redeem the pill.56  In 
the case of a dead hand poison pill, only the continuing directors can redeem.57  
In any event, in the absence of elimination of the pill, the bidder can proceed 
with the acquisition only by suffering a massive dilution.58 
Another key feature of the poison pill is that it generally is adopted by 
board action alone and requires no shareholder approval.59  This is a major 
advantage that the poison pill offers over many other defensive measures.60  
The board might seek shareholder advisory votes regarding adopting, 
amending, or redeeming a pill; however, the board usually acts on its own.61  
Furthermore, poison pills can be adopted by the target board as a pre-offer 
defensive technique or as a defensive measure in the face of a threat or an 
actual hostile offer.62 
3. Basic and Various Forms of the Poison Pill 
A poison pill, in its basic form, is described as: 
[A] distribution to stockholders of a right which acquires significant economic 
value upon the occurrence of specified events involving a non-board-approved 
acquisition of a significant ownership position in the company.  Since this 
economic value consists of an entitlement to receive money or property from 
the company or the raider, and the acquisition cannot be consummated without 
triggering this entitlement, the raider cannot swallow up the company without 
also ingesting the economic poison represented by the value that has to be 
delivered upon exercise of the rights.63 
The “right” is triggered upon the occurrence of specified events relating to 
a change or threatened change in control of the target company.  The triggering 
event normally occurs when an acquirer obtains a certain percentage of a 
company’s outstanding voting stock, generally fifteen to twenty percent (in 
some cases as low as ten percent).64  Prior to the occurrence of the specified 
triggering event, the rights remain economically valueless.65 
 
 56. Copeland, supra note 54, at 703. 
 57. Bialkin & Wray, supra note 8, at 13. 
 58. Id. at 12. 
 59. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2, § 5.01[B][2], at 5-8.  This assumes that there is 
adequate authorized stock available, either common or preferred, to support the issuance of the 
rights.  Id. 
 60. For example, a staggered board requires an amendment to the company’s charter and has 
to be approved by shareholders.  RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND 
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 736-37 (2d ed. 1995). 
 61. Lese, supra note 5, at 2181. 
 62. Block, supra note 12, at 638. 
 63. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2, § 5.01[B][1], at 5-6. 
 64. Lese, supra note 5, at 2180. 
 65. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2, § 5.01[B][1], at 5-6. 
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Since their initial introduction in the mid-1980s, poison pills have mutated 
into diverse forms with distinct operating features.  The most common type 
incorporates both “flip-in” and “flip-over” provisions.  Under a flip-in feature, 
target shareholders are allowed to exercise a right to buy stock of the target 
company at a substantially discounted price, most often fifty percent of the 
market rate, when a bidder crosses a certain ownership threshold of the target’s 
outstanding stock.66  The crossing of the ownership threshold by the acquirer 
triggers the flip-in provision regardless of the acquirer’s intentions with respect 
to the use of the shares.67  At that time, rights vest in all shareholders other 
than the acquirer, entitling these rights-holders to acquire additional shares of 
voting stock of the target company at the discounted price.68  Flip-in plans 
operate on the theory that a bidder will be reluctant to trigger such a rights plan 
due to the consequent dilution of its equity in the target when the rights plan 
takes effect.69  Under a flip-over feature, target shareholders are given rights to 
buy shares of the bidder at a discounted price, again most often at half the 
then-current market price, if the bidder is able to obtain control of the target 
and completes the merger.70 The bidder then is obligated to honor the rights 
and sell shares in the merged company to the target’s shareholders at the 
discounted price.71  This obligation results in a substantial dilution of the 
holdings of the acquirer’s original shareholders.72 
Variations of the common flip-in provisions exist, including the “adverse 
person” provision,73 “double flip-in” plans,74 and exchange provisions.75  In 
 
 66. Block, supra note 12, at 638. 
 67. Lese, supra note 5, at 2180. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Block, supra note 12, at 638. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Victor I. Lewkow & William A. Groll, “Poison Pills” and Other Structural Defenses: 
Uses and Abuses in the Age of Saying “No,” in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1991, at 
417, 424 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6954, 1991). An “adverse 
person” provision gives the target board discretion, in the event it determines that an “adverse 
person” is accumulating stock, to reduce the percentage flip-in threshold (e.g., from 30% to 15% 
or 10%).  Id.  An “adverse person” is one who, in the opinion of a majority of the target’s outside 
directors, is deemed likely to be seeking “greenmail” or other short-term financial gain not in the 
target’s long-term interest, or whose ownership bloc is itself reasonably likely to cause a material 
adverse impact on the target’s business or prospects.  Id.  In some variations, the board can 
simply reduce the triggering threshold if it deems that appropriate, without a specific finding that 
a potential acquirer is “adverse.”  Id. 
 74. Id. at 425.  The “double flip-in” plan contains two triggering percentages, such as in the 
rights plan adopted by Ducommun, Inc.  Id.  During the period between 10 days after an acquirer 
reaches an initial 17% threshold and 60 days after such date, all stockholders other than the 
acquirer automatically become entitled to purchase 50% of Ducommun’s outstanding common 
stock at 20% of the then-current market price unless the acquirer delivers to Ducommun, at least 
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addition to the common flip-in and flip-over plans, less common forms exist 
such as convertible preferred stock dividend plans,76 “put” plans,77 “back-end” 
or debt provision plans,78 and disproportionate voting provision plans.79  In 
practice, companies often use various combinations of different poison pill 
provisions.  A flip-in provision is virtually always accompanied by a flip-over 
provision.80 
 
20 days prior to attaining the first trigger level, a disclosure statement which discloses its 
intentions, the total number of shares it intends to purchase, the price to be offered, and the 
proposed financing.  Id.  Additionally, the acquirer must agree (1) not to acquire over 25% of 
Ducommun’s stock without board approval; (2) not to take any action inconsistent with the 
disclosure statement; (3) only to effect a merger with board approval; and (4) not to attempt to 
elect more than one director to the board.  Id.  In the event that the acquirer purchases beyond a 
second trigger level (i.e., 25%) without filing the disclosure statement, assuming it can bear the 
costs of buying through the initial 17% trigger, the rights plan provides that all stockholders 
except the acquirer have the right to purchase shares of the target at one-half of the market price.  
Id.  A “fair” all-cash tender offer (as determined by the target company’s investment banker) 
would not trigger either “flip-in” percentage.  Id. 
 75. Id.  “Exchange provisions” allow the target board, following occurrence of a flip-in 
event, to elect to call each outstanding right (other than the rights held by the triggering 
shareholder, which are voided) in exchange for one share of the target’s common stock.  Id.  The 
purpose of this provision is to give the board the option of causing an insurgent to be diluted 
without relying upon the stockholders to put up cash to exercise their rights.  Id.  Of course, such 
dilution would not be as great (depending upon the exercise price of the rights and the then-
current market value of the common stock) as it would be if all rights were exercised pursuant to 
the standard flip-in provision.  Id.  Exchange provisions frequently can be implemented only by 
the board if the insurgent owns less than 50% of the company’s common stock.  Id. 
 76. Animashaun, supra note 6, at 177.  “Convertible preferred stock dividend plans” entitle 
common stock of the target company to a pro-rated dividend consisting of special redemption and 
conversion privileges.  Id. 
 77. Block, supra note 12, at 639. “Put plans” entitle target shareholders to sell their shares 
back to the target at a designated price (or a price set by formula) if a bidder buys a majority, but 
not all, of the target’s shares.  Id.  By giving shareholders the option of selling back to the target, 
put plans allow shareholders to avoid the effect of the second step in a two-tiered front-end 
loaded offer.  Id.  The price payable pursuant to the put may also discourage shareholders from 
selling into the first step tender offer, if the price offered is less than the put price, thereby forcing 
a bidder to pay a higher price to accomplish the acquisition.  Id. 
 78. Id.  The “back-end provision” plan grants shareholders the right to redeem their shares 
for cash or debt securities once a hostile bidder obtains a certain percentage of the corporation’s 
outstanding stock. The redemption price is generally significantly higher than the current market 
value of the stock. Back-end provisions serve as a defensive mechanism by establishing a 
minimum takeover price.  Id. 
 79. Id.  “Disproportionate voting provisions” are calculated to give large shareholders 
inferior voting rights. They operate by issuing a preferred class of stock that carries favored 
voting rights (such as multiple voting rights) to current shareholders. Any shareholder acquiring 
shares after the date the preferred stock is issued does not obtain the superior voting rights, and 
thereby has diminished voting status.  Id. 
 80. Animashaun, supra note 6, at 176. 
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B. Development and Attributes of the “Dead Hand” Poison Pill 
The latest variations of the poison pill are the so-called dead hand poison 
pill and its variation, the no hand poison pill.81  As noted earlier, on one hand, 
widespread implementation of poison pills by target companies has greatly 
enhanced the ability of these companies to delay or defeat hostile bidders’ 
naked tender offers.82 On the other hand, bidders have added more weapons to 
their arsenal to gain control of target companies.83  One such weapon is to 
combine a tender offer with a consent solicitation or proxy contest to unseat 
the incumbent board.84 The bidder’s nominees, once elected, may then redeem 
the existing poison pill.85  Therefore, the standard poison pill become 
powerless in the face of such a combined approach.  To combat this tactic, 
some companies have expanded and strengthened defensive capacities of the 
pill by adding a dead hand provision.86 
1. The “Pure” Dead Hand Provision 
In its pure form, a dead hand provision mandates that only “continuing 
directors” and no one else can redeem the poison pill during the entire pill’s 
life.87  For example, the pills adopted by Healthdyne in Invacare and by Toll 
Brothers in Toll Brothers are of this type.88 A pure dead hand poison pill can 
be redeemed freely as long as the incumbent directors or their chosen 
successors remain in office.89  Even if a slate of directors nominated by the 
hostile bidder replaces the incumbent directors through a proxy contest, the 
newly elected directors would not qualify as “continuing directors” and 
therefore would lack the power to redeem the pill.90  Thus, the pure dead hand 
provision defeats a potential bidder’s strategy of dismantling a pill through 
waging a proxy contest.  Also, it precludes a sale of the company for the entire 
life of the pill if no continuing director remains in office after the proxy 
contest.91 
In sum, the pure dead hand provision strengthens the defensive attributes 
of a poison pill by emphasizing the redemption power of the incumbent board 
 
 81. For descriptions of the dead hand and no hand poison pills, see supra text accompanying 
notes 18-21. 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Lese, supra note 5, at 2187. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Elofson, supra note 25, at 309. 
 88. See infra Part III.B-C. 
 89. Elofson, supra note 25, at 310. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 3. 
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of the target company.92 The other features of the pill, including the triggering 
event, typically remain the same. 
2. Modified Dead Hand Provisions 
Some pills contain a milder form of the dead hand feature.  For instance, a 
less extreme type of the dead hand provision provides that only directors who 
were elected with a supermajority shareholder vote have the power to redeem 
the pill.  For example, in Bank of New York,93 only directors elected with a 
two-thirds vote of the shareholders (as well as the continuing directors) can 
redeem the pill.94  Theoretically, the impact of this type of provision is less 
severe than that of a pure dead hand provision.  The only additional hurdle it 
raises is the requirement that the raider slate wins two-thirds, rather than a 
mere majority, of the vote before it can redeem the pill.95 
Another less extreme version is the dead hand provision of limited 
duration, also known as the delayed redemption provision or no hand 
provision.  The no hand provision enables a board newly elected through a 
proxy contest waged by a hostile bidder to redeem the pill, but only after a 
waiting period, for example, 180 days.96 During the waiting period, none of the 
directors (whether continuing or newly elected) has the power to redeem the 
pill.97  The pill recently challenged in Quickturn contained such a feature.98  
The no hand poison pill would not preclude a sale of the company.  But, it 
could delay the sale effectively for a period of six months, despite of the 
replacement of the incumbent board.99  The no hand pill appears milder when 
compared with the pure dead hand pill, whose “waiting period” can be up to 
ten years.100 
The judicial review of dead hand provisions in poison pills by different 
courts will be discussed in depth in Section III below. 
 
 92. Elofson, supra note 25, at 310. 
 93. 528 N.Y.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). 
 94. In Bank of New York, Irving Bank adopted a pill which allowed redemption only if (1) 
the board had a majority of continuing directors; (2) the non-continuing directors had been 
elected by a two-thirds majority; or (3) the non-continuing directors had been elected when no 
merger proposal was pending.  Id. at 483. 
 95. Elofson, supra note 25, at 311. 
 96. Id. at 311 (noting that Commercial Intertech adopted such a pill and successfully warded 
off United Dominion’s takeover attempt). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1287-88. The Quickturn board adopted a no hand pill in response 
to Mentor’s tender offer joined with a proxy contest to displace the board, providing that no 
newly elected board could redeem the poison pill for six months after taking office if the purpose 
or effect of the redemption would be to facilitate a business combination with someone who 
backed the election of new directors to the board.  Id. 
 99. Elofson, supra note 25, at 311. 
 100. Id. at 311. 
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C. Validity of the Poison Pill 
After the debut of the poison pill in 1984, uncertainty concerning its 
validity led to litigation.  The first and leading decision was Moran v. 
Household International, Inc. handed down by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
November 1985, upholding a flip-over rights plan under Delaware law.101  
Thereafter, most other states, either through judicial decisions or legislation, 
have confirmed the legality of poison pills.  The legal analysis first turns on 
what legal standard should be used when reviewing the validity of the poison 
pill. 
1. Development of the Enhanced Business Judgment Rule 
It is well established that, in taking any corporate action, directors 
generally owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its 
shareholders.102 Traditionally, case law provided that the business judgment 
rule was the applicable legal standard for reviewing a board’s actions taken in 
managing the business and affairs of the corporation pursuant to its duty of 
care.103 Directors’ actions normally enjoy a presumption of validity under the 
business judgment rule.104 
Nevertheless, in the takeover context, when the board of a Delaware 
corporation takes action to resist a hostile bid for corporate control, the 
possibility of entrenchment exists and the board’s defensive actions thus 
become subject to the “enhanced” judicial scrutiny established in Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.105  This is also known as the “enhanced” business 
judgment rule, applicable to all anti-takeover defensive actions adopted by a 
board of a Delaware corporation. 
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated that defensive 
measures adopted by a board were subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny.106  For 
a target board’s actions to be entitled to the protection of the business judgment 
rule, the target board must first satisfy the Unocal two-prong test.  First, the 
 
 101. See infra text and accompanying notes 112-24. 
 102. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 60, at 801. The duty of care requires that the directors 
must adequately inform themselves, entertain reasonable deliberation and make their decisions in 
good faith.  Id. at 811-13.  The duty of loyalty requires that the directors act for the corporation 
and its shareholders in a fair and open manner and with the utmost good faith.  Id. at 813-15. 
 103. Id. at 801, 811. 
 104. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  The traditional business judgment 
rule is a court-created presumption that “in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interest of the company.”  Id.  It does not apply to breach of the duty of loyalty by 
directors. CHARLES HANSEN, A GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT 17-18 (1995). 
 105. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 106. Id. at 954. 
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target board must demonstrate (and therefore has the burden of propounding 
evidence) that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the hostile bid 
constituted a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness;107 second, it must 
show that the defensive measures adopted were “proportionate,” that is, 
reasonable in relation to the threat that the board reasonably perceived.108 
The Unocal standard was later clarified in Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
General Corp.,109 in which the Delaware Supreme Court explained that unless 
a defensive measure was “draconian,” by being “coercive or preclusive,”110 the 
board’s actions would be upheld so long as they were within a “range of 
reasonable responses.”111 
2. The Legal Standard Governing the Poison Pill: Statutory 
Authorization and the Enhanced Business Judgment Rule—the Bases 
for the Poison Pill’s Validity 
Whether a target board will adopt a poison pill in the face of a hostile 
offer, or as a pre-planned defensive measure, involves a two-part analysis.  
First, the design of the pill must be valid under state corporate law and the 
board must have the statutory authority to adopt it.  Whether the board has the 
statutory authorization turns on an interpretation of the statute.  Without this 
authorization, no poison pill will be upheld in any state.  Second, the action of 
the board in adopting the pill must be consistent with its fiduciary duties.  That 
is, for the board of a Delaware corporation, the adoption, use, and redemption 
of the pill, an anti-takeover defensive measure, must satisfy the Unocal two-
prong test of the enhanced business judgment rule before the board can be 
accorded the protection of the traditional business judgment rule. 
a.  Adoption of the Poison Pill 
Several months after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the 
two-part legal standard discussed above in analyzing the validity of a flip-over 
 
 107. Id. at 955.  The board may satisfy the first prong “by showing good faith and reasonable 
investigation . . . .”  Id. 
 108. Id.  The court articulated that the second prong entails: 
An analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the 
corporate enterprise.  Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price 
offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 
“constituencies” other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and 
perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of 
securities being offered in the exchange. 
Id. 
 109. 651 A.2d 1361, 1372-74 (Del. 1995). 
 110. Id. at 1367, 1388-91. 
 111. Id. 
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poison pill adopted as “a preventive mechanism to ward off future advances” 
in Moran.112 
Addressing corporate authority as a threshold issue, the court held that the 
board had the authority, under various provisions of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, to issue both the rights and, upon the exercise thereof, the 
underlying stock.113  The court emphasized that: 
Of course, the business judgment rule can only sustain corporate decision 
making or transactions that are within the power or authority of the [b]oard.  
Therefore, before the business judgment rule can be applied it must be 
determined whether the [d]irectors [a]re authorized to adopt the [r]ights 
[p]lan.114 
Next, the court analyzed the action of the board under the Unocal two-
prong test.115  The court held that, despite the absence of an actual hostile offer, 
the board reasonably perceived a generalized threat arising from unfair or 
coercive acquisition techniques existing in the industry.116  The court also held 
that the rights plan adopted by the board was a proportionate response to such 
threat because it was necessary, in the board’s good faith belief, to protect the 
corporation from those coercive acquisition techniques.117  Thus, the court 
concluded that the board was entitled to “receive the benefit of the business 
judgment rule in their adoption of the [r]ights [p]lan,” and upheld the pill.118 
Nevertheless, the Moran court established a fundamental condition to the 
validity of the poison pill, that is, the pill adopted by the board cannot 
undermine the shareholders’ franchise.119  The effect of any defensive 
measures, including the poison pill, upon proxy contests must be minimal.120  
This minimal effect of defensive measures upon the shareholders’ franchise 
 
 112. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-50, 1355-57 (Del. 1985). 
 113. Id. at 1351-55 (citing §§ 151(g) and 157 of the Delaware General Corporation Law). 
 114. Id. at 1350. 
 115. Id. at 1355. 
 116. Id. at 1356-57. 
 117. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57. The court noted that in fact, “[t]here [was] little change in 
the governance structure as a result of the adoption of the [r]ights [p]lan,” and “[c]omparing the 
[r]ights [p]lan with other defensive mechanisms, it does less harm to the value structure of the 
corporation than do the other mechanisms” upheld by various courts.  Id. at 1354. 
 118. Id. at 1357.  The court specifically noted that: 
[P]re-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under 
the pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise reasonable judgment.  
Therefore, in reviewing a pre-planned defensive mechanism it seems even more 
appropriate to apply the business judgment rule. 
Id. at 1350 (citing Warner Communications v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1491 (D. Del. 
1984)). 
 119. Id. at 1355. 
 120. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
238 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:223 
was later confirmed in Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,121 in which the 
Delaware Chancery Court held that “[w]here boards of directors deliberately 
employ[] . . . legal strategies either to frustrate or completely disenfranchise a 
shareholder vote, . . . [t]here can be no dispute that such conduct violates 
Delaware law.”122  The Blasius court noted that the shareholder vote has 
primacy in corporate governance because it is the “ideological underpinning 
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”123  Without “a 
compelling justification,” no defensive mechanism that purposefully interferes 
with the shareholder franchise can be sustained.124 
Following Delaware’s lead, numerous courts have upheld the validity of 
rights plans containing flip-over, flip-in, back-end, and other provisions under 
relevant state corporate codes.125  These cases have supported the authority of 
the board of directors of a corporation to adopt rights plans and issue rights 
without any shareholder approval prior to or in the face of an actual hostile 
offer. 
b. Statutory Developments: State Legislation Validating Poison Pills 
The Moran case involved a flip-over rights plan, and not a flip-in plan.  
Under a flip-in plan, all shareholders of the target company, except the bidder, 
are entitled to exercise their rights to purchase stock of the target upon the 
occurrence of the triggering event.126  Thus, a flip-in plan can create two new 
categories of shareholders of the target company—bidder shareholders and 
non-bidder shareholders—and treat each category differently.  This proved not 
to be an issue in Delaware because Delaware law allows disparate treatment of 
 
 121. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 122. Id. at 659-63. 
 123. Id. at 659. 
 124. Id. at 661. 
 125. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 
1986) (wherein the Delaware Supreme Court spoke approvingly of a flip-in rights plan in dicta); 
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff’d in part on other 
grounds, and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (wherein the District Court for the 
District of Minnesota refused to grant a preliminary injunction against a Minnesota corporation’s 
rights plan under Minnesota law because the corporation’s board adopted the plan in its sound 
business judgment); Harvard Indus. v. Tyson, No. 86-CV-74639-DT, 1986 WL 36295, at *1 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 1986) (wherein the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
refused to grant a preliminary injunction against a Michigan corporation’s rights plan under 
Michigan law because the plan only discriminated among shareholders, not shares, and the 
corporation’s board adopted the plan in its sound business judgment); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. 
Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 728 F. Supp. 807 (D. Me. 1990) (wherein the District Court for 
the District of Maine approved a flip-in rights plan after noting legislative intent underlining anti-
takeover statutes in Maine and other states). 
 126. For a discussion of the features of a flip-in pill, see supra text accompanying notes 66-
69. 
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different holders of shares of the same class.127  Nevertheless, this 
discriminatory feature of the flip-in plan was a cause of concern to a number of 
courts in different jurisdictions and initially was held invalid in some.128  In 
response, the legislatures of those states passed laws expressly upholding their 
legality.129  These statutes often grant directors broad discretion to determine 
the terms of rights issued under poison pills.  Some of them have been used to 
“justify yet stronger varieties of poison pills.”130 
c. Use and Redemption of the Poison Pill 
Initially, litigation centered on the initial adoption of the pills.131  In 
Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that the legality of adopting 
a rights plan is an issue separate from the decision to redeem the rights in the 
face of a specific tender offer.132  Noting that the decision to reject a request to 
redeem the rights will be judged by the same enhanced business judgment rule 
as it is applied to the use of any other defensive mechanism in the takeover 
context, the Delaware Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he Rights Plan is not absolute.  When the Household Board of Directors is 
faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem the Rights, they will not be 
able to arbitrarily reject the offer.  They will be held to the same fiduciary 
standards any other Board of Directors would be held to in deciding to adopt a 
defensive mechanism, the same standard as they were held to in originally 
approving the Rights Plan . . . .133 
The Board does not now have unfettered discretion in refusing to redeem the 
Rights.  The Board has no more discretion in refusing to redeem the Rights 
than it does in enacting any defensive mechanism.134 
 
 127. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 5 n.3 (citing Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 
378 A.2d 121, 122-24 (Del. 1977); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 
1985)). 
 128. Id. at 5 n.4 (citing, e.g., Topper Acquisition Corp. v. Emhart Corp., No. Civ. A. 89-0010-
R, 1989 WL 513034, at *1 (D.C. Va. Mar. 23, 1989) (Virginia law); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. 
Farley Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (Georgia law); R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway, Inc., 
644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (Wisconsin law); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 
F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (New Jersey law)). 
 129. Id. at 5 n.5 (citing, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-624 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7- 7 
(West Supp. 1992); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 505 (McKinney Supp. Ann. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 180 (West 1992); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 415-20 (1988)). 
 130. Id. at 2. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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i. Judicial Reluctance to Order the Pill Redemption 
In judging a board’s decision not to redeem a rights plan or to redeem it for 
one bidder but not for another, courts generally adopt the same analytical 
framework established by Unocal.  A number of courts, applying Delaware 
law, have ruled on motions for preliminary injunctions, which sought to enjoin 
the operation or to compel the redemption of a poison pill.  Because the 
“prudent deployment” of the pill had proven to be beneficial to the 
shareholders,135 the courts generally deferred to the board’s discretion and 
were extremely reluctant to order the redemption of poison pills on fiduciary 
duty grounds.136 
Courts applying Delaware law have held that even a fully financed, “all-
cash, all-shares” premium offer can present a threat such that refusing to 
disarm a rights plan may be a reasonable response.137  The rationale is that “a 
target board facing a proxy contest joined with a hostile tender offer could, in 
good faith, employ non-preclusive defensive measures to give the board time 
to explore transactional alternatives;” nonetheless, a board could not “erect 
defenses that would either preclude a proxy contest altogether or improperly 
bend the rules to favor the boards’ continued incumbency.”138 
 
 135. As observed by the Toll Brothers court, the prudent deployment of the pill often resulted 
in a bidding contest, which culminated in an acquisition on terms superior to the initial hostile 
offer. Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 136. See, e.g., Unitrin. Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (1995) (refusing to 
enjoin the operation of a rights plan with flip-in and flip-over provisions); Tate & Lyle PLC v. 
Staley Continental Inc., No. Civ. A. 9813, 1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch., May 9, 1988) (wherein the 
Delaware Chancery Court refused to enjoin a shareholder rights plan with both flip-over and flip-
in (20% trigger) provisions and refused to order redemption of rights under plan); BNS Inc. v. 
Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D.C. Del. 1988) (wherein the district court refused to order 
directors of a Delaware corporation to redeem rights under a plan that had both flip-in and flip-
over rights); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(wherein the New York district court, applying Delaware law, upheld the validity of a rights plan 
containing both flip-in and flip-over provisions and refused to order the board to redeem rights); 
Buckhorn Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that a back-end plan 
was a reasonable response to an offer the court characterized as being, in effect, a two-tier offer, 
but striking down the specific plan in question because of a lack of sufficient care in setting the 
exercise price); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(wherein the Illinois district court refused to grant an injunction blocking the operation of a back-
end plan adopted by an Indiana corporation). 
 137. See, e.g., Moore v. Wallace Computer, 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D.C. Del. 1995) (wherein the 
district court refused to order a Delaware corporation to redeem its rights plan in the face of a 
tender offer despite the fact that nearly 75% of the corporation’s shareholders tendered their 
shares; the court concluded that (1) the board’s decision not to redeem the pill was a reasonable 
response to the takeover threat because the shareholders were uninformed about the promising 
financial prospects of the company and (2) the board’s actions were designed to protect the 
shareholders from what the board considered to be a lowball offer). 
 138. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1186-87. 
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ii. Limited Exception 
There have been exceptions to the judicial reluctance to order the pill 
redemption, but such exceptions are very limited and have only been applied in 
a few cases.  For example, in City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc.,139 the 
Delaware Chancery Court enjoined the use by Interco of a poison pill to 
protect a corporate restructuring plan undertaken by the Interco board as a 
defense to an unsolicited all-cash tender offer.140  The court held that the 
continued use of the poison pill served the purpose of only “preclud[ing] the 
shareholders from exercising a judgment about their own interests that differs 
from the judgment of directors” and ordered Interco to redeem its pill.141  
Some commentators opined that the Interco conclusion was short-lived142 and 
was effectively overruled, one year later, by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.143  Some other commentators 
view the Interco decision as an illustration of the differing conclusions courts 
have reached at different times based on different facts.  In their view, Interco 
simply represented the prevailing thought at the time, though case law has 
since been more protective of directors’ actions. 
D. Controversy Surrounding Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills 
In a nutshell, the scholarly debate and controversy surrounding dead hand 
provisions in poison pills centers on discrimination between incumbent and 
future boards created by continuing director provisions and the negative effect 
on shareholders’ voting rights.144 
Opponents of dead hand provisions attack them primarily on both statutory 
and fiduciary duty grounds.  They question their validity because these 
provisions create two classes of directors—those who can redeem the pill, and 
those who cannot.  The effect of this division is that continuing directors have 
the power to limit the discretion of future directors.145  Such limitation on 
 
 139. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 140. Id. at 787. Interco had determined they would implement a restructuring plan that the 
board’s financial advisor estimated to be valued at $76 to the stockholders in the face of a $74 all-
cash offer for all shares by Rales Brothers. Id. at 790. 
 141. Id. at 798.  First, the court felt that the threat posed by the tender offer was primarily 
economic rather than coercive. Id.  Although the economic threat was sufficient to justify the use 
of a poison pill for a period of time in order to negotiate a better deal, once that period ended, the 
legitimate role of the poison pill was fully satisfied. Id.  Then, the court determined that Rales 
Brothers had made their “final” offer and, for that reason, the bidding contest had reached the 
“end-stage.” Interco, 551 A.2d at 798. The court also noted that there was a wide divergence of 
opinion as to the value to stockholders of the proposed restructuring. Id. at 798-800. 
 142. Elofson, supra note 25, at 320-21. 
 143. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 144. Lese, supra note 5, at 2177. 
 145. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 3. 
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future boards conflicts with the corporate statutes of many states, including 
Delaware, whose statutes confer a full range of power to directors to manage 
the business and affairs of a corporation.146  Some commentators further argue 
that the dead hand pill infringes upon a shareholders’ franchise because 
shareholders will be “coerced” to vote for the incumbent directors even though 
they favor the new nominees, who are stripped of the power to redeem the pill 
for its entire life or for a crucial period.147  A fundamental principle in 
corporate law is that the shareholders, through their power to elect directors, 
retain ultimate control over the use of pills and the future of their 
corporation.148  Therefore, the dead hand provision cannot be justified because 
it has the effect of disenfranchising shareholders,149 even though it could 
provide shareholders some limited benefits.150 
Supporters of dead hand poison provisions, on the other hand, argue that 
continuing director provisions do not prevent shareholders from freely electing 
the directors of their choice, in spite of the fact that current directors have the 
power to limit the discretion of future directors.151  Some state statutes embrace 
the “continuing directors” concept and/or expressly authorize directors’ sole 
discretion to fix the terms and conditions of the poison pill.152  In these states, 
adoption of continuing director provisions is within the boundary of powers 
granted to directors by such statutes.153  
Supporters offer two additional justifications.  First, continuing director 
provisions help defend shareholders against coercive two-tiered tender offers, 
which can be used to pressure shareholders into selling their shares to a hostile 
bidder.154  Second, continuing director provisions give an incumbent board 
 
 146. See infra Parts III.A, III.C. 
 147. Lese, supra note 5, at 2177. 
 148. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 3. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Elofson, supra note 25, at 343. 
 151. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 3. 
 152. There are a number of states that have statutes which allow “continuing director” 
restrictions, for example, Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1111 (1981), Kentucky, see KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-220 (1984), and North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-9-03 
(1987). 
 153. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 3. 
 154. Corporate Law – Takeover Defenses – Northern District of Georgia Upholds Continuing 
Director Provision of Poison Pill – Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 968 F. 
Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REV. 1626, 1630 (1998) [hereinafter Corporate Law].  
In a two-tiered tender offer, the bidder typically offers cash for a majority of the target’s shares, 
and then acquires the remaining shares for a lower price through a “freeze-out” merger.  See Lese, 
supra note 5, at 2184-85.  Shareholders may feel compelled to tender their shares out of fear that 
the takeover will succeed and lead to a “freeze-out” that will victimize those shareholders who 
did not tender immediately.  Id. at 2185.  This threat was the justification for the original 
development of the poison pill.  JESSE H. CHOPER & JOHN C. COFFEE ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 903 (4th ed. 1995). 
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time to look elsewhere for a better offer when a potential acquirer attempts to 
stampede shareholders into a hasty decision.155  Nonetheless, opponents 
counter-argue that these two justifications are based on the same rationale 
offered to support ordinary poison pills. 
The section below discusses the judicial review of dead hand provisions by 
different courts under different state laws. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DEAD HAND PROVISIONS 
– A MIXED RECORD 
Although poison pills have generally been held valid by state courts, the 
dead hand pill and its variations have received little judicial scrutiny until 
recently156 and have had a mixed reception in courts.157  Despite the debate 
among scholars and commentators regarding the validity of dead hand 
provisions,158 and the position of some scholars calling for a per se 
invalidation,159 or for imposition of severe limitations on their use,160 so far, 
only six decisions have squarely addressed the validity of dead hand 
provisions.  The courts were unable to reach a consensus as to the validity of 
the dead hand feature.  All of the arguments discussed above were advanced by 
both sides and were carefully considered by the courts in each of the six cases.  
This section analyzes the mixed reception of the dead hand feature, pure and 
modified, in different courts applying different state laws. 
A. New York: Invalidated in Bank of New York v. Irving Bank  
The first challenge to the validity of the dead hand pill was brought in the 
New York Supreme Court in 1988.161  The pill, adopted by Irving Bank, 
mandated that it could be redeemed only by continuing directors or directors 
 
 155. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2, §5.01[A], at 5-5 (explaining that poison pills 
“enabl[e] target companies’ boards to respond to hostile bids in a deliberative and unfrenzied 
manner”). These considerations most likely explain the references to continuing directors in the 
Georgia Fair Price and Business Combination statutes, which the court cited to establish that 
continuing director provisions are “not contrary to public policy in Georgia.” Invacare, 968 F. 
Supp. at 1580-81. See also CHOPER & COFFEE ET AL., supra note 154, at 1054 (noting that state 
“fair price” statutes are “[d]irected against the two-tier takeover”); Corporate Law, supra note 
154, at 1630. 
 156. Corporate Law, supra note 154, at 1626. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See sources cited supra note 25. 
 159. Lese, supra note 5, at 2177.  See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The 
Impact of Rights Plans on Proxy Contests: Reevaluating Moran v. Household International, 14 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 327 (1994); Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards of 
Judicial Review of Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 BUS. L. 647 (1992). 
 160. Elofson, supra note 25, at 303. 
 161. Bank of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d 482.  
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elected by a supermajority vote of two-thirds of the shareholders.162  
Essentially, this provision created “several different classes of directors—
having different powers or having to be elected by different majorities to 
exercise all of the powers.”163 
The court held that the provision involved “illegal discrimination.”  The 
court reached this conclusion by distinguishing between the power of a board 
that consisted of continuing directors or those elected by supermajority and the 
power of a board otherwise validly elected by a plurality as provided in the 
statute.164  The court noted that, pursuant to the New York Business 
Corporation Law, any restriction on the power of the board must be placed in 
the certificate of incorporation.165  In the absence of contrary provisions in 
 
 162. Id. at 483.  The relevant portion of Irving Bank’s rights plan reads as follows: 
 [T]he Board of Directors of the Company shall be entitled so to redeem the Rights only if 
it consists of a majority of Continuing Directors (as hereinafter defined) or, if the Board of 
Directors of the Company is not so constituted, only if the members of the Board of 
Directors of the Company who are not Continuing Directors were elected to immediately 
succeed Continuing Directors and either (i) were elected by the affirmative vote of the 
holders of at least two-thirds of the issued and outstanding Shares of the Company or (ii) 
in connection with the election of the members of the Board of Directors of the Company 
who are not Continuing Directors, no merger, consolidation, liquidation, business 
combination or similar transaction or series of transactions with respect to the Company is 
or was adopted.  The term “Continuing Director” shall mean a director who either was a 
member of the Board of Directors of the Company prior to March 15, 1988 or who 
subsequently became a director of the Company and whose election, or nomination for 
election by the Company’s shareholders, was approved by a vote of a majority of the 
Continuing Directors then on the Board of Directors of the Company. 
Id. 
 163. Id. at 484.  The court noted that four classes of directors were created as follows: 
The first [group] are directors who were in office prior to March 15, 1988 [on which date 
the amended rights plan was adopted], and who have all rights of directors.  The second 
group are directors who are elected after March 15, 1988 and whose election was 
approved by a vote of the majority of the first group.  This group also has all the rights of 
directors. 
The third group are directors elected after March 15, 1988 and who have not postponed or 
agreed to certain actions relating to mergers.  These are the actions which the first group 
has decided to block. 
The fourth and final group are directors who were elected by the vote of the holders of at 
least two-thirds of the shares.  This group also has all the rights of directors. 
Id. at 483-84. 
 164. Id. at 485. 
 165. Id.  § 614 of the New York Business Corporation Law sets forth the voting requirements 
for the election of directors of a New York corporation as follows: “Directors shall, except as 
otherwise required by this chapter or by the certificate of incorporation as permitted by this 
chapter, be elected by a plurality of the votes cast at a meeting of shareholders by the holders of 
shares entitled to vote in the election.” Id.  § 620 provides that: 
A restriction of the board’s power to manage the business of the corporation is invalid 
unless (1) all of the incorporators or all of the shareholders of record have authorized such 
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Irving Bank’s certificate of incorporation, such a limitation on the future 
board’s power ran afoul of New York statutory provisions.166  In essence, as 
the court noted, “[a]t issue here [was] not the propriety of the adoption of the 
plan, but rather the legality of Section 23 [of the plan], the provision restricting 
the power of duly elected directors to conduct business of the corporation 
otherwise conductible by directors elected in a specified manner.”167  The 
business judgment rule was not an issue in this particular case.  This decision 
thwarted the use of the dead hand poison pill in New York, and by analogy 
elsewhere for a number of years.168 
B. Georgia: Upheld in Invacare v. Healthdyne Technologies  
In mid-1997, nine years after Bank of New York, the validity of the dead 
hand provision again was challenged, this time under Georgia law, in Invacare 
Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc.169  In Invacare, the court rejected a 
challenge to the pure dead hand poison pill adopted by Healthdyne, a Georgia 
corporation, to fend off a tender offer joined with a proxy contest by Invacare, 
an Ohio corporation.170  Healthdyne’s poison pill provided that: 
[A]ny redemption or amendment of the rights plan [had] to be approved by one 
or more directors who were members of the board prior to the adoption of the 
rights plan, or who were subsequently elected to the board with the 
recommendation and approval of the other continuing directors.171 
With the presence of such a pill, Invacare was effectively precluded from 
utilizing a proxy contest to unseat Healthdyne’s incumbent directors for the 
purpose of redeeming the pill.172  Thus, the hostile bid could not proceed 
unimpeded.173 
Invacare sought a preliminary injunction declaring the invalidity of the 
continuing director provision and directing the Healthdyne board to remove the 
provision from its rights plan.174  Invacare contended that the provision 
 
provision on the certificate of incorporation; (2) subsequent shareholders have notice of 
the provision; and (3) no shares of the corporation are listed on a national securities 
exchange or in an over-the-counter market. 
Id. 
 166. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 614 (McKinney 1986). 
 167. Bank of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 485. 
 168. Gordon, supra note 25, at 532.  After Bank of New York, the dead hand pill apparently 
was used much less by companies, and was thus excluded from some recent compilations of anti-
takeover defensive measures.  Id. 
 169. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1579. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Invacare, 968 F. Supp. at 1579. 
 174. Id. 
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involved an “improper limitation” on the future board’s powers in violation of 
the Georgia statute which stated that all corporate powers should be exercised 
by the company’s board of directors.175 
The court upheld the validity of the continuing director provision, ruling 
that the provision was consistent with Georgia law and public policy.176  In 
upholding the continuing director provision, the district court relied on sections 
14-2-624(a) and (c) of the Georgia Business Corporation Code, which 
provided directors broad latitude and “sole discretion” to set the terms and 
conditions of a shareholder rights plan and stated that “[s]uch terms and 
conditions need not be set forth in the articles of incorporation.”177  The court 
also relied on references to the “continuing directors” concept in the Georgia 
Fair Price and Business Combination Statutes.178  The court therefore 
 
 175. Id. at 1580.  Specifically, Invacare contended that the provision violated §14-2-801(b) of 
the Georgia Business Corporations Code, which provides: 
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and 
affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to 
any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation, bylaws approved by the 
shareholders, or agreements among the shareholders which are otherwise lawful. 
Id.  Invacare argued that the continuing director provision was illegal because it was a significant 
limitation on the power of board and the limitation was not set forth in Healthdyne’s articles of 
incorporation or bylaws.  Id. 
 176. Id. at 1580-81. 
 177. Id.  Relevant parts of §§ 14-2-624(a) and (c) provide the following: 
A corporation may issue rights, options, or warrants with respect to the shares of the 
corporation whether or not in connection with the issuance and sale of any of its shares or 
other securities.  The board of directors shall determine the terms upon which the rights, 
options, or warrants are issued, their form and content, the consideration for which they 
are to be issued, and the terms and conditions relating to their exercise, including the time 
or times, the conditions precedent, and the prices at which and the holders by whom the 
rights, options, or warrants may be exercised . . . . Nothing contained in Code Section 14-
2-601 shall be deemed to limit the board of directors authority to determine, in its sole 
discretion, the terms and conditions of the rights, options, or warrants issuable pursuant to 
this Code section.  Such terms and conditions need not be set forth in the articles of 
incorporation. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The court rejected Invacare’s argument that the continuing director 
provision was illegal because it was a significant limitation on the power of the board and the 
limitation was not set forth in Healthdyne’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.  Id. at 1580. 
 178. Invacare, 968 F. Supp. at 1580-81.  In particular, the Georgia Fair Price Statute provides 
that when a vote is needed to approve a business combination, that business combination must be: 
(1) unanimously approved by the continuing directors provided that the continuing 
directors constitute at least three members of the board of directors at the time of such 
approval; or (2) recommended by at least two-thirds of the continuing directors and 
approved by a majority vote entitled to be cast by holders of voting shares, other than 
voting shares beneficially owned by the interested shareholder who is, or whose affiliate 
is, a party to the business combination. 
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concluded that “the concept of continuing directors is an integral part of a 
takeover defense and is not contrary to public policy in Georgia.”179 
Invacare also contended that the continuing director provision violated 
directors’ fiduciary duties and improperly interfered with the exercise of 
shareholder voting rights without any demonstration of a “compelling 
justification” for its adoption.180  The court rejected Invacare’s argument, 
noting, “Georgia law requires directors to perform their duties in good faith in 
a manner believed to be in the best interest of the corporation.”181  The court 
held that a “compelling justification” requirement conflicted with the standard 
set forth in the Georgia statute.182  The court concluded that, unlike the 
situation in Blasius, the continuing director provision in Healthdyne’s rights 
plan did not interfere with shareholder voting rights; nor was it coercive, 
because it did not infringe on the shareholder’s right to elect a new board.183 
The Invacare court distinguished Bank of New York, pointing out that the 
prior case was decided on the basis of a New York statute containing a general 
prohibition on restrictions of the board’s power to manage the corporation.184  
The Georgia statutes contained no such prohibition.185 
The Invacare decision spawned extensive scholarly comments.186  Some 
commentators predicted that the Invacare holding was likely to lead to “a new 
found popularity of this defense measure even though the particular decision 
 
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1111).  The Georgia Business Combination Statute provides that a 
bylaw opting into the statute cannot be repealed without “the affirmative vote of at least two-
thirds of the continuing directors . . . .” Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1133(b)). 
 179. Id. at 1581. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(a)(1)). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Invacare, 968 F. Supp. at 1581. 
 184. Id. at 1580. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Neil C. Rifkind, Should Uninformed Shareholders Be a Threat Justifying 
Defensive Action by Target Directors in Delaware: “Just Say No” After Moore v. Wallace, 78 
B.U. L. Rev. 105, 151 (1998); Gordon, supra note 25, at 552; Corporate Law, supra note 154, at 
1631; Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Activism By Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1094 (1998); Robert C. Schwenkel & Judith 
R. Thoyer, Advising the Board of Directors in the M&A Context, in ADVANCED DOING DEALS: A 
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COMPLETING THE TRANSACTION, at 7, 35 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7235, 1998); Kenneth J. Bialkin & Robert G. Wray, Recent 
Developments in Mergers & Acquisitions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE: BLUEPRINT 
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE 1990’S, at 649, 679 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. B0-000X, 1998); Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr. & James C. Scoville, Mergers 
and Acquisitions in the Insurance Industry: Preparing For and Responding to a Hostile Bid, in 
INSURANCE M&A: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO STRUCTURING COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS, at 
391, 404 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7217, 1997). 
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relied on peculiar features of Georgia law.”187  On the other hand, they also 
observed that “[o]pponents of continuing director provisions may be expected 
to continue to argue against them, based on their impact on directorial 
discretion and shareholder voting rights.”188 
While commentators and corporate practitioners were still determining the 
impact that Invacare would have on courts in other states; while they were 
determining what advice to give to their corporate clients; and while they were 
speculating how Delaware courts would rule on this issue, a year later, the 
Delaware courts finally were given an opportunity to articulate a position on 
this unsettled issue in Toll Brothers and Quickturn, as discussed below. 
C. Delaware: Invalidated in 
1. Carmody v. Toll Brothers: A Cognizable Claim is Stated Against the 
“Pure” Dead Hand Provision 
The first challenge in Delaware to the adoption of a pure dead hand poison 
pill was brought to the Delaware Chancery Court for review in Carmody v. 
Toll Brothers.189  On July 24, 1998, the court handed down its decision 
refusing to dismiss a claim asserting the invalidity of the dead hand poison pill 
adopted by Toll Brothers.190  The court decided that the claim asserted, if 
proven, would provide a basis for judicial relief.191  
In addition to the standard “flip-in” and “flip-over” features, Toll Brothers’ 
rights plan contained a distinctive dead hand feature, authorizing only 
 
 187. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 4 (“Companies incorporated in those states may, 
however, attempt to use the decision to justify adopting rights plans with continuing director 
provisions, or adding continuing director provisions to existing pills.”).  See also Gordon, supra 
note 25, at 533. 
 188. Brown & Regner, supra note 25, at 4. 
 189. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 190. Id. at 1182.  On June 12, 1997, the board of directors of Toll Brothers, a Pennsylvania 
based Delaware corporation, adopted a rights plan.  Id. at 1183-84.  The plan was adopted as a 
preventive measure to protect against the risk of a hostile takeover that is inherent in the line of 
business in which Toll Brothers engages.  Id.  A “continuing director” in Toll Brothers’ rights 
plan is defined as the following: 
(i) any member of the Board of Directors of the Company, while such person is a member 
of the Board, who is not an Acquiring Person, or an Affiliate [as defined] or Associate [as 
defined] of an Acquiring Person, or a representative or nominee of an Acquiring Person or 
of any such Affiliate or Associate, and was a member of the Board prior to the date of this 
agreement, or (ii) any Person who subsequently becomes a member of the Board, who is 
not an Acquiring Person, or an Affiliate [as defined] or Associate [as defined] of an 
Acquiring Person, or a representative or nominee of an Acquiring Person or of any such 
Affiliate or Associate, if such Person’s nomination for election or election to the Board is 
recommended or approved by a majority of the Continuing Directors. 
Id. at 1184. 
 191. Id. at 1182. 
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“continuing directors”  to redeem the pill.192  A dispute over the legality of this 
pure dead hand provision prompted the lawsuit. 
Plaintiff contended that the continuing director provisions of Toll Brothers’ 
poison pill were invalid because (1) they violated sections 141(a) and (d) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law by interfering with the directors’ statutory 
power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation; (2) they were 
adopted “solely or primarily for entrenchment purposes” and were “a 
disproportionate defensive measure,” in contravention of the principles of 
Unocal and Unitrin; and (3) they “purposefully interfere[d] with the 
shareholder voting franchise without any compelling justification, in 
derogation of the principle articulated in Blasius . . . .”193 
First addressing plaintiff’s statutory claim, the court concluded that the 
dead hand provision in Toll Brothers’ rights plan was statutorily invalid 
because it ran afoul of sections 141(a) and (d) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law for several reasons.194  First, the court found that the dead 
hand provision created different classes of directors—those who could redeem 
the pill and those who could not—and made different voting power distinctions 
among directors until the rights would expire on June 12, 2007.195  This 
interference with the directors’ statutory power to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation violated section 141(d) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law in the absence of an explicit authorization in Toll Brothers’ 
certificate of incorporation.196  Second, the court noted that section 141(d) 
mandated that the right to impose limitations on the directors’ power is 
reserved to shareholders, not to directors or a subset thereof.197  The dead hand 
provision, by vesting the pill redemption power exclusively in the continuing 
directors, transgressed the statutorily protected shareholder right to “elect the 
directors who would be so empowered.”198  Third, the court held that the dead 
 
 192. Id. at 1183-84. 
 193. Id. at 1189-90. 
 194. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1190-92. 
 195. Id. at 1190. 
 196. Id. at 1191.  The pertinent portion of §141(d) provides as follows: 
The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any class or series of stock 
the right to elect one or more directors who shall serve for such term, and have such 
voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation.  The terms of office 
and voting powers of the directors elected in the manner so provided in the certificate of 
incorporation may be greater than or less than those of any other director or class of 
directors. 
Id. Under § 141(d), such a distinction may be created only under explicit provisions in the 
certificate of incorporation.  Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.  Absent explicit language in Toll Brothers’ certificate of incorporation, “nothing in 
Delaware law suggests that some directors of a public corporation may be created less equal than 
other directors, and certainly not by unilateral board action.” Id. 
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hand provision would impermissibly interfere with the directors’ statutory 
power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation conferred by 
section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which states as 
follows: 
 The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as 
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation 
. . . .199 
The interference was apparent because a newly elected future board would 
be deprived of the power to achieve a business combination due to its lack of 
authority to redeem the pill without obtaining the consent of the continuing 
directors.200 
The court also cited the 1988 New York Supreme Court opinion in Bank of 
New York for support.201 The court concluded that although the relevant 
language of the Delaware and New York statutes was not identical, the 
underlying intent of both statutes was the same: both required that limitations 
upon the directors’ power be expressed in the certificate of incorporation.202  
The Court distinguished Toll Brothers from Invacare on the basis that the 
Delaware statutes contained provisions materially different from those in the 
Georgia statute.203 
Toll Brothers contended that the dead hand provision in its poison pill did 
not “facially preclude or interfere with proxy contests as a means to gain 
control, or coerce shareholders to vote for or against any particular director 
slate.”204  It further contended that the dead hand provision was “tantamount to 
a delegation to a special committee, consisting of the [c]ontinuing [d]irectors, 
of the power to redeem the pill.”205 However, the court disagreed with these 
contentions and concluded that Toll Brothers’ arguments had no merit because 
the first contention was not a response to the statutory claim and the second 
rested on the wrong analogy.206 
Turning to plaintiff’s fiduciary claims under Blasius, the court noted that 
“[t]he validity of antitakeover measures [was] normally evaluated under the 
Unocal/Unitrin standard.”207  Nevertheless, defensive measures that 
 
 199. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1191. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1191-92. The Delaware court stated that “[t]he statutory analysis employed, and 
the result reached here, are consistent with and supported by Bank of New York Co. v. Irving 
Bank Corp.”  Id. at 1191. 
 202. Id. at 1192. 
 203. Id. at 1192 n.38. 
 204. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1192. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1193. 
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purposefully interfere with shareholders’ franchise must be evaluated under the 
Blasius standard and cannot be sustained without a “compelling 
justification.”208  The court particularly noted that a fundamental condition 
supported by the decision in Moran involved the ability of shareholders to 
replace the board with directors willing to redeem the pill.209  In this case, Toll 
Brothers’ shareholders would be powerless to elect a board that was both 
willing and able to accept the bid, and they could be forced to vote for 
incumbent directors.210 Observing that the individual shareholder’s vote had 
primacy in Delaware’s scheme of corporate jurisprudence and corporate 
governance, and that any attempt to interfere with the shareholder’s voting 
rights was difficult to justify,211 the court concluded that the Blasius claim was 
cognizable under Delaware law.212 
Plaintiff also alleged that the dead hand provision would either preclude a 
proxy contest altogether or coerce shareholders supporting a hostile bid to vote 
for the incumbent directors opposing the bid.213  The court held that such an 
allegation also supported plaintiff’s Unocal/Unitrin claim that the dead hand 
provisions were disproportionate and unreasonable defensive measures.214 
For these reasons, the court concluded that the complaint stated legally 
sufficient claims that survived the motion to dismiss.215  Although the ruling 
took the form of a denial of Toll Brothers’ motion to dismiss, it was virtually a 
denial on the merits of the validity of the pure dead hand provision.  The 
statutory analysis of the validity of the dead hand feature employed by the 
court and the holding of the case proved to be consistent with that of the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Quickturn. 
2. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro: The Modified Dead Hand 
Provision Is Held Invalid 
On December 31, 1998, the Delaware Supreme Court rendered a sweeping 
decision in Quickturn, concluding that the no hand provision in a poison pill 
was invalid as a matter of Delaware law.216  This holding establishes a “bright 
line” principle that any dead hand provision, in whatever form, is per se invalid 
under Delaware law. 
 
 208. Id. (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992) (articulating the Blasius 
standard)). 
 209. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1193. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1193-94 
 212. Id. at 1192-94. 
 213. Id. at 1194-95. 
 214. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1194-95. 
 215. Id. at 1195. 
 216. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1283 (Del. 1998). 
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In Quickturn, in response to Mentor’s tender offer and proxy contest to 
replace the Quickturn board,217 the board enacted two defensive measures.218  
The first was an amendment to the bylaws, delaying the holding of any special 
stockholders meeting for ninety to one hundred days after the receipt and 
determination of the validity of the stockholders’ request by Quickturn.219  The 
second was an amendment to the existing shareholder rights plan, eliminating 
its dead hand feature and replacing it with a no hand feature; that is, a delayed 
redemption provision (a “DRP”).220  Under the DRP, no newly-elected board 
could redeem the poison pill for six months after taking office if the purpose or 
effect of the redemption would be to facilitate a business combination with an 
“Interested Person,” that is, someone who backed the election of new directors 
to the board, which in this case was Mentor.221 
On December 3, 1998, the Chancery Court, applying the Unocal two-
prong test to the two defensive measures, upheld Quickturn’s bylaw 
amendment222 but declared that the adoption of the DRP was invalid because it 
was a disproportionate response to the threat the board reasonably perceived 
because it created an unjustified additional delay.223  After concluding that the 
 
 217. Id. at 1285-87.  On August 12, 1998, Mentor Graphics Corp. announced an unsolicited 
cash tender offer for all outstanding common shares of Quickturn, and its intent to wage a proxy 
contest to replace the incumbent board by calling for a special shareholders’ meeting pursuant to 
the provisions of Quickturn’s bylaws.  Id. at 1285-86.  The Quickturn board, after three meetings, 
rejected Mentor’s offer as inadequate.  Id. at 1286-87. 
 218. Id.  Mentor challenged the two newly adopted anti-takeover measures in the Delaware 
Chancery Court seeking declarative and injunctive relief.  See Mentor Graphics v. Quickturn 
Design Sys., 728 A.2d at 25, 36 (Del. Ch. 1998).  Mentor sought (1) a declaratory judgment that 
Quickturn’s newly adopted takeover defenses were invalid and (2) an injunction requiring the 
Quickturn board to dismantle those defenses.  Id.  Mentor advanced virtually the same 
contentions as the ones in Toll Brothers.  Id. at 37-38. 
 219. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1287. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Mentor, 728 A.2d at 38-43. 
 223. Id. at 43-52.  Applying the Unocal/Unitrin test to Quickturn’s defensive measures, the 
court first concluded that the board reasonably perceived a cognizable threat because “Quickturn 
shareholders might mistakenly, in ignorance of Quickturn’s true value, accept Mentor’s 
inadequate offer, and elect a new board that would prematurely sell the company before the new 
board could adequately inform itself of Quickturn’s fair value and before the shareholders could 
consider other options.” Id. at 46.  The court further concluded that the DRP was not coercive 
because, under the facts, a majority of Quickturn’s shareholders actually tendered their shares to 
Mentor.  Id. at 47-49.  If there was “coercion,” it had worked to the benefit of Mentor.  Id. at 49.  
Additionally, it was not preclusive because the DRP could only delay the sale of the company for 
six months; while under the facts, Mentor had obtained a “secure financing commitment that is 
effective for three years – a period far longer than the six month delay that the DRP would 
occasion.”  Id.  Nonetheless, the court found that the adoption of the DRP was a disproportionate 
response to Mentor’s bid under the circumstance. Id.  It was disproportionate because the bylaw 
amendment already would delay the holding of a special shareholders’ meeting for three months 
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DRP was invalid under the fiduciary duty ground, the court stated that it was 
unnecessary to address the plaintiff’s statutory claim that the DRP was ultra 
vires under section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.224 
On appeal,225 the Delaware Supreme Court declared that the no hand 
feature violated fundamental Delaware law, and “[o]n that alternative basis,” it 
affirmed the judgment of the Delaware Chancery Court.226  This was the first 
ruling of the Delaware Supreme Court in which the court squarely addressed 
the illegality of the no hand provision in the poison pill. 
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that “[o]ne of the most basic tenets of 
Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate 
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.”227  The 
court noted that it was this inherent power of the board conferred by section 
141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law228 that constituted the basis 
upon which the adoption of the rights plan in Moran was upheld as a legitimate 
exercise of business judgment by the board.229  The court emphasized that 
section 141(a) required any limitation on the board’s authority be set out in the 
certificate of incorporation.230  Because there were no such limitations in 
Quickturn’s charter, the board exceeded its authority in adopting the DRP, 
under which a newly elected board of directors would be prevented “from 
 
so as to enable the Quickturn board and shareholders to seek other alternatives.  Id. at 50.  There 
is no justified reason to delay the redemption of a poison pill for six additional months by 
adopting the DRP.  Id. at 52. 
 224. Id. at 44. 
 225. On December 28, 1998, Quickturn filed an expedited appeal from the final judgment 
entered by the Chancery Court, alleging that the court erred in finding that the adoption of the 
DRP by the board was a violation of the board’s fiduciary duty.  Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1282-83. 
Mentor, on the other hand, argued that the court’s ruling should be affirmed because the DRP was 
invalid in that it violated § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law by “impermissibly 
depriv[ing] any newly elected board of both its statutory authority to manage the corporation 
[there]under and its concomitant fiduciary duty pursuant to that statutory mandate.”  Id. at 1291. 
 226. Id. at 1283, 1290-93.  The Delaware Chancery Court did not rule on the statutory ground 
whether the no hand poison pill violated Delaware law.  Mentor, 728 A.2d at 44.  Instead, the 
Chancery Court applied the Unocal two-prong test and concluded that the no hand pill was 
invalid because it was not a proportionate response to the threat reasonably perceived by the 
Quickturn board.  Id. at 49-52. 
 227. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291. 
 228. § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states as follows: 
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. 
DEL. STAT. ANN. § 141(a). 
 229. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291. 
 230. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
254 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:223 
completely discharging its fundamental management duties to the corporation 
and its stockholders for six months.”231  The court observed the following: 
While the [DRP] limits the board of directors’ authority in only one respect, 
the suspension of the Rights Plan, it nonetheless restricts the board’s power in 
an area of fundamental importance to the shareholders – negotiating a possible 
sale of the corporation.  Therefore, we hold that the [DRP] is invalid under 
Section 141(a), which confers upon any newly elected board of directors full 
power to manage and direct the business and affairs of a Delaware 
corporation.232 
The court also noted that the directors have a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation and its shareholders, which extends to board conduct in a contest 
for corporate control.233  Moreover, “no defensive measure can be sustained 
which would require a new board of directors to breach its fiduciary duty.”234  
The DRP is no exception.  The DRP “tends to limit in a substantial way the 
freedom of [newly elected] directors’ decisions on matters of management 
policy,” therefore, “it violates the duty of each [newly elected] director to 
exercise his own best judgment on matters coming before the board.”235 
In sum, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the no hand 
provisions, by restricting the directors’ ability to discharge their duties, even if 
only for six months, violated Delaware law.  Intellectually, even a one-day 
delay is unsustainable.  Applying the Quickturn reasoning to other types of 
dead hand provisions, pure or modified, none would survive judicial scrutiny 
because all of them discriminate between incumbent and future boards and 
restrict the latter’s ability to discharge its duties.  Essentially, this New Year’s 
Eve decision by the Delaware Supreme Court put an end to the use of the dead 
hand pill, in whatever form, by Delaware corporations.236 
D. Pennsylvania: Upheld in AMP  v. Allied Signal   
On October 8, 1998, prior to Quickturn but after Toll Brothers, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying Pennsylvania law, 
upheld the validity of a no hand poison pill adopted by AMP Incorporated, a 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 1291-92 (emphasis added by the court). 
 233. Id. at 1292. 
 234. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1292. 
 235. Id. at 1292 (quoting Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch. 1956), rev’d 
on other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957)).  Nevertheless, the court specifically noted that 
Mentor’s slate of directors, upon being elected at a shareholders’ meeting, would be bound to 
discharge an “unremitting” fiduciary duty to manage the corporation for the benefit of Quickturn 
and its shareholders, and not for the sole benefit of Mentor.  Id. 
 236. Steven Lipin, Delaware Supreme Court Ruling Bans Quickturn Tactic to Fend Off 
Mentor, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1999, at A18. 
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Pennsylvania corporation.237  The no hand feature of AMP’s poison pill 
provided that the pill was non-redeemable and non-amendable by a newly 
elected board for a limited duration of 15 months.238 
In AMP, in response to Allied Signal’s tender offer joined with a consent 
solicitation and two proposed bylaw amendments, the AMP board amended its 
existing poison pill by removing the pure dead hand feature.239  This made the 
pill absolutely non-redeemable and non-amendable for a fifteen-month period 
(until November 6, 1999) if a hostile bidder gained majority representation on 
the AMP board or if Allied Signal’s three-person committee proposal was 
adopted by AMP’s shareholders.240 
The federal district court ruled in AMP’s favor, upholding AMP’s 
amendments to its poison pill.241  The court noted that (1) under Pennsylvania 
corporate law, broad deference is accorded to a target board when it adopts 
shareholder rights plans242 and (2) the board’s adoption of defensive measures 
to resisting unsolicited takeovers are subject to the “ordinary” business 
judgment rule.243 
Citing section 2513(a) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, the 
court stated that directors had substantial authority to fix the terms of a 
shareholder rights plan and shareholders were bound by those terms.244  
 
 237. AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc., Civ. A. Nos. 98-4405, 98-4058, and 98-4109, 1998 WL 
778348, at *1, *12-*13 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998). 
 238. Id. at *2-*3. 
 239. Id. On August 4, 1998, Allied Signal, a Delaware corporation, announced an all-cash 
tender offer for all outstanding common shares of AMP, and declared its intention to initiate a 
consent solicitation to acquire control of AMP. Id. at *1-*2.  Despite the seemingly broad support 
of AMP’s shareholders for Allied Signal’s tender offer (as of September 14, 1998, 72% of AMP’s 
shareholders had tendered their shares), the AMP board rejected Allied Signal’s offer as 
inadequate.  Id.  To achieve its objective of gaining control of AMP’s 11-member board and 
dismantling AMP’s existing poison pill, which contained a pure dead hand feature, Allied Signal 
proposed a consent solicitation seeking, among other things, an amendment to AMP’s bylaws.  
Id.  Under Allied Signal’s bylaws amendment proposal, the AMP board would be expanded to 28 
members so that Allied Signal’s 17 nominees, upon being elected to the board, would constitute a 
majority thereof.  Id. at *2.  In response, the AMP board amended its poison pill, removing the 
dead hand feature and making the pill absolutely non-redeemable and non-amendable for a 15-
month period (ending November 6, 1999) in the event that a hostile bidder gained majority 
representation on the AMP board.  Id.  Allied Signal responded by proposing another bylaws 
amendment that would remove all control over the poison pill from the AMP board and give it to 
a three-person committee to be formed later.  Id. at *3.  The AMP board again amended its poison 
pill to make the non-redemption and non-amendment provisions applicable if the three-person 
committee proposal were adopted by AMP’s shareholders.  Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. AMP, 1998 WL 778348, at *11. 
 242. Id. at *4 citing 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2513. 
 243. Id. at *5 citing 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(d). 
 244. Id. at *4-*5.  Section 2513 (a) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law provides 
that a Pennsylvania corporation may set forth “such terms as are fixed by the board of directors,” 
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Moreover, under Pennsylvania law, shareholders do not have the power to strip 
the board of its authority to adopt a poison pill through amendments to bylaws 
or otherwise.245 
Furthermore, the court held that AMP’s amendments to the poison pill 
were “presumed to be in the best interests of the corporation” and therefore did 
not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.246  The amendments were designed to 
“counter an anticipated unlawful act by Allied Signal and other shareholders to 
take away statutory board authority.”247  The court noted that, unlike the board 
of a Delaware corporation which is subject to the Unocal enhanced scrutiny 
test, the actions of the AMP board (consisting of a majority of disinterested 
directors) were entitled to the protection conferred by the traditional business 
judgment rule.248 
Specifically, the court emphasized the finite nature of the non-redemption 
and non-amendment provisions, which were applicable for only fifteen 
months.249  The court articulated that: 
Were this not so, it would mitigate towards a finding of lack of good faith or 
self-dealing.  Being finite in time, the duration must be viewed in light of the 
ordinary business judgment rule that is allowed directors, as well as the 
presumptions of good faith for disinterested majorities established in Section 
1715(d) In [sic] matters dealing with potential or proposed acquisition of 
control of the corporation.250 
The court concluded that the AMP board, in amending the poison pill, 
validly exercised its authority under Pennsylvania law.  The board did not 
engage in an ultra vires act because a poison pill under Pennsylvania law may 
contain any terms fixed by the board.251  The AMP board, by statute, was not 
required to redeem the pill in order to comply with its fiduciary duties.252  The 
directors of a Pennsylvania corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation 
itself and are “not required to act solely because of the consideration that might 
be paid to shareholders in the event of an acquisition.”253 
 
including, but not limited to, “conditions that preclude or limit any person or persons owning or 
offering to acquire a specified number or percentage of the outstanding common shares . . . from 
exercising, converting, transferring or receiving the shares . . . .”  Id. at *5. 
 245. Id. at *5. 
 246. Id. at *7. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at *5, *8, *10. 
 249. AMP, 1998 WL 778348, at *8. 
 250. Id. (emphasis added). 
 251. Id. at *6. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at *5-*6. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. Comparison of Disparate Holdings and Statutes: Different Jurisdictions, 
Different Approaches 
Bank of New York, Toll Brothers and Quickturn, on one hand, and 
Invacare and AMP, on the other, represent two different approaches to 
analyzing the validity of dead hand provisions in both pure and modified 
poison pills.  The logic for the two approaches rests on different legislative 
schemes existing in different states.  Both the Georgia and Pennsylvania 
legislature have expressly granted directors sole or substantial discretion to 
undertake defensive measures, including adopting rights plans, to fend off 
hostile takeovers.254  These states have deliberately enacted statutes providing 
greater protection to directors’ actions in takeover contexts than that is 
provided under Delaware law.255  In particular, the Pennsylvania legislature 
has explicitly rejected Delaware’s view that a board owes a fiduciary duty to 
both the corporation and its shareholders.256  Under Pennsylvania law, as the 
court emphasized in AMP, the directors of a Pennsylvania corporation owe a 
fiduciary duty only to the corporation.257 
Delaware courts, on the other hand, have emphasized that directors cannot 
ignore shareholders’ interests since they owe fiduciary duties to both the 
corporation and its shareholders.258  In a takeover contest involving a Delaware 
corporation as the target, directors’ defensive actions are subject to enhanced 
judicial scrutiny before they may be afforded the protection of the traditional 
business judgment rule.259  Furthermore, when upholding the first poison pill, 
the Moran court emphasized: 
Of course, the business judgment rule can only sustain corporate decision 
making or transactions that are within the power or authority of the [b]oard.  
Therefore, before the business judgment rule can be applied it must be 
determined whether the [d]irectors [a]re authorized to adopt the [r]ights 
[p]lan.260 
The New York Supreme Court noted the same in Bank of New York: 
At issue here [was] not the propriety of the adoption of the plan, but rather the 
legality of Section 23 [of the plan], the provision restricting the power of duly 
 
 254. See supra Parts III.B, III.D. 
 255. See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.D. 
 256. AMP, 1998 WL 778348, at *5. 
 257. Id. at *5-*8. 
 258. See supra Part III.C. 
 259. See supra Part II.C. 
 260. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350. 
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elected directors to conduct business of the corporation otherwise conductable 
by directors elected in a specified manner.261 
Dead hand and no hand provisions in poison pills are invalid under 
Delaware and New York law because they violate the statutory provisions 
before the enhanced business judgment rule can even be applied.262 
In contrast, directors of Pennsylvania and Georgia corporations have 
broader latitude to fix the terms and conditions of poison pills.263  Moreover, 
directors of Pennsylvania corporations are not subject to enhanced judicial 
scrutiny and are protected under the traditional business judgment rule.264 
B. Comparison of the Delaware Courts’ Approaches 
Even within Delaware, approaches to the no hand provision vary to some 
extent.  The Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court did 
not address the no hand provision in the same manner.  Although the Supreme 
Court’s decision controls, it is still worth discussing the different rulings of the 
two courts. 
In a footnote in Toll Brothers, the Chancery Court specifically stated that 
its decision did not represent an opinion on “the validity of a ‘dead hand’ 
provision of limited duration.”265  In Quickturn, the same court adopted a case-
by-case approach and applied the Unocal/Unitrin and Blasius tests to 
determine whether each defensive measure was valid.266  After determining 
that the adoption of the no hand provision was invalid, the court stated that it 
was unnecessary to rule on the statutory claim advanced by Mentor.267  These 
two decisions clearly indicate that the Chancery Court adopted a case-by-case, 
fact-sensitive approach and was somewhat reluctant to hold the no hand 
provision per se invalid.  Perhaps, as one commentator suggested, “it should be 
acknowledged that per se invalidation of any kind of business decision is a 
dramatic step that courts are properly reluctant to take.”268 
Nevertheless, in declining to declare that the no hand feature violated state 
law, the Chancery Court left open many questions.  Might a different result 
have been reached if the DRP was the only defensive measure adopted?  What 
if the DRP provided only a three-month delay, a two-month delay, a one-
month delay, or a one-day delay? 
 
 261. Bank of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 485. 
 262. See supra Parts III.A, III.C. 
 263. See supra Parts III.B, III.D. 
 264. See supra Part III.D. 
 265. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1195 n.52. 
 266. Mentor, 728 A.2d at 37-43. 
 267. Id. at 40. 
 268. Elofson, supra note 25, at 326. 
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If the Chancery Court left the door ajar, the door was closed completely by 
the Delaware Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court, without explicitly 
endorsing or disapproving of the Chancery Court’s fiduciary duty analysis,269 
ruled directly on Mentor’s statutory claim.  The Supreme Court held that the 
no hand provision was invalid as a matter of Delaware law, and “on that 
alternative basis,” affirmed the Chancery Court’s holding, similar to its ruling 
in Quickturn.270  After declaring the no hand provision invalid as a matter of 
law, there was no need for the court to discuss the second part involved in the 
poison pill validity analysis, that is, the application of the Unocal/Unitrin and 
Blasius tests to determine the propriety of the adoption of the plan.  Simply 
put, under Quickturn, a board cannot adopt an illegal rights plan.  It is this 
conflict with the statutes that renders dead hand provision, in whatever form, 
per se invalid under Delaware law. 
C. Aftermath of Toll Brothers and Quickturn for Delaware Corporations 
Well-known for the preeminence in America’s corporate jurisprudence, 
opinions of Delaware courts have always been closely followed by business 
and legal communities.  The Toll Brothers and Quickturn opinions are no 
exception.  Newspapers and journals timely reported these decisions; corporate 
practitioners quickly informed their clients of these rulings.271 
If Invacare and AMP somehow encourage companies to consider adopting 
a dead hand poison pill or adding the dead hand feature to their existing pills, 
then Toll Brothers certainly cautions the dead hand provision adopters and 
would-be-adopters to reconsider this option.  Shortly after Toll Brothers, many 
corporations, including both Delaware and non-Delaware corporations, 
voluntarily eliminated continuing director provisions because the decision cast 
doubt on the validity of the dead hand provision.272  Many companies, 
 
 269. Mentor did not file a cross-appeal, challenging the Chancery Court’s decision upholding 
the validity of Quickturn’s amendment to its bylaws, therefore, the Supreme Court held that the 
bylaw amendment was not an issue in the appeal and held that the Chancery Court’s ruling 
thereon had become final.  Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1289. 
 270. Id. at 1293. 
 271. See, e.g., Lipin, supra note 236, at A18; De Sup. Ct. Affirms Quickturn Ruling, Bars Any 
Variant of Dead Hand Poison Pill, ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP., Jan. 4, 1999, at 3; 
Elizabeth Kaplan, Dead Hand Defenses: Ruling Leaves Fate of Poison Pills Unresolved, N.Y. 
L.J., Dec. 10, 1998, at 5; Courts Bars Quickturn’s Use of Another Version of “Dead Hand” 
Poison Pill, ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP., Dec. 7, 1998, at 3; Jef Feeley, Dead-Hand Pills 
Being Dropped, NAT’L L. J., Nov. 9, 1998, at B1; Steven Lipin, Limited “Dead Hand” Poison 
Pill Is Tested, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1998, at B16; Jesse A. Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, 
Challenge to “Dead Hand” Poison Pill Rights Plan Sustained In Delaware, INSIGHTS, Sept. 
1998, at 16; Meredith M. Brown & William D. Regner, Delaware Court Allows Challenge to 
“Dead Hand” Poison Pill  (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.debevoise.com> (click on 
“search” and type in “dead hand”). 
 272. Feeley, supra note 271, at B1. 
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including some giants, simply were unwilling to take the risk.273 Hilton Hotels 
Corporation, Texas Instruments Inc., Intuit, Inc., Aquila Pharmaceuticals, and 
Encad, Inc. were among these companies.274  In the wake of Toll Brothers, 
shareholders even filed lawsuits in the Delaware Chancery Court, seeking to 
eliminate the dead hand poison pills adopted by the boards of their 
companies.275  For those companies that were considering adopting a dead 
hand poison pill, a good suggestion was: “for a company not facing a takeover, 
there’s no reason to buy yourself a lawsuit, and that’s what you are doing by 
having one of these [dead hand] pills right now.”276  Several months later, 
Quickturn simply eliminated the adoption of any dead hand poison pill by 
Delaware corporations as a viable defensive measure. 
A declaration of the illegality of the dead hand provision, including one of 
limited duration, renders poison pills a much less effective defense when a 
bidder joins its tender offer with a proxy contest or consent solicitation.  The 
bidder’s slate of directors, upon taking office, will be free to dismantle any pill 
immediately unless the target company has a staggered board. 
Nevertheless, other viable devices are available that allow Delaware 
corporations to fend off hostile joint tender offers without running afoul of Toll 
Brothers and Quickturn.  For example, target companies may amend their 
charters to (1) adopt a staggered board; (2) place limitations on shareholder’s 
ability to remove directors; or (3) eliminate the right of shareholders to call 
special meetings or act by written consent.277  Target companies may also 
either amend their bylaws to delay a shareholders’ meeting calling for the 
election of directors or postpone an annual meeting to a later date so that the 
target board and management may explore alternatives to ward off hostile 
 
 273. Id.; see also Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Corporate Update: Mergers and 
Acquisitions, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 1998, at 5. 
 274. BRYAN, SIMON & CO., supra note 20, at Intro.-8. 
 275. For example, on September 4, 1998, a shareholder of Texas Instruments Inc. filed a 
complaint with the Delaware Chancery Court, asking the court to eliminate the dead hand pill, 
which was adopted by the board one month before the Toll Brothers decision.  Kotin v. Texas 
Instruments Inc., No. 16626 (Del. Ch.), noted in ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP., Dead Hand 
Poison Pills: Suit Challenges Texas Instrument Dead-Hand Pill in Wake of Carmody, Sept. 21, 
1998, at 4.  The shareholder claimed that there was no valid business purpose for the board’s 
adoption of the dead hand poison pill as a preventive measure upon the expiration of the old 
standard poison pill; thus, the board breached its fiduciary duty.  Id. 
 276. Feeley, supra note 271, at B1. 
 277. John J. Demott, Mergers and Acquisitions of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, in 
INSTITUTE OF BANKING LAW AND REGULATIONS 1990, at 823, 904 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. B4-4314, 1990). 
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offers.  The Delaware courts have upheld these measures taken by companies 
when they are fending off hostile tender offers.278 
Among the alternatives mentioned above, a staggered board is the most 
effective defensive device to deter a hostile bidder’s proxy contest to unseat 
the incumbent board.  Statutorily permitted under Delaware law, a staggered 
board has only a portion (normally one-third) of its directors elected in a given 
year.279  If a target company has a staggered board, a hostile bidder winning a 
proxy contest will only enjoy minority representation on the target board.280  
To gain control of the target board, two or more consecutive shareholders’ 
meetings must be held.281  Thus, having a staggered board renders the first 
proxy contest somewhat impotent and buys the target board and management 
more time to seek alternatives.282  The staggered board has the effect of 
delaying an acquisition for at least one whole year (and up to two years) 
without entrenchment or violation of state corporate statutes.  This result is 
more than the six-month delay afforded by a typical no hand poison pill. 
Nonetheless, one significant obstacle to this strategy is that it requires an 
amendment to a corporation’s charter.  In other words, it requires shareholders’ 
approval.  This may not be obtained easily, especially in light of the recent 
opposition to such provisions by some institutional shareholders.  It might 
prove to be extremely difficult for those companies that have already gone 
public to amend their charters.  One major reason why poison pills have been 
so popular is because shareholder approval is not needed for the 
implementation.283  In any event, despite the foregoing difficulty, it remains a 
good advice for companies just going public to adopt a staggered board.  
Indeed, it is quite common for companies to adopt a staggered board, and 
numerous companies have such a device in place.284 
If a staggered board or other devices, which also require shareholder 
approval, are not feasible, another option remains: a board-adopted bylaw 
amendment requiring advance notice when any shareholder calls a special 
shareholders’ meeting.  Such an amendment recently has been upheld as a 
valid and reasonable defensive measure by the Delaware Chancery Court in 
Quickturn,285 and the Delaware Supreme Court has not overturned the 
 
 278. See, e.g., Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch. 1995) (upholding a delay of a 
shareholder-called special meeting); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990) 
(upholding a postponement of an annual meeting). 
 279. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1180, 1186 n.17 (Del Ch. 1998). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Block et al., supra note 12, at 635. 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
 284. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 60, at 736-37. 
 285. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 38-43 (Del. Ch. 
1998). 
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Chancery Court’s holding.286  In Quickturn, an important issue arose 
concerning the validity of such a bylaw amendment.  In response to Mentor’s 
bid, the Quickturn board adopted the following amendment to section 2.3 of 
the corporation’s bylaws (amended portion appears in italics for emphasis): 
A special meeting of the stockholders may be called at any time by (i) the 
board of directors, (ii) the chairman of the board, (iii) the president, (iv) the 
chief executive officer, or (v) subject to the procedures set forth in this Section 
2.3, one or more stockholders holding shares in the aggregate entitled to cast 
not less than ten percent (10%) of the votes at that meeting. 
Upon request in writing sent by registered mail to the president or chief 
executive officer by any stockholder or stockholders entitled to call a special 
meeting of stockholders pursuant to this Section 2.3, the board of directors 
shall determine a place and time for such meeting, which time shall be not less 
than ninety (90) nor more than one hundred (100) days after the receipt and 
determination of the validity of such request, and a record date for the 
determination of stockholders entitled to vote at such meeting in the manner 
set forth in Section 2.12 hereof.  Following such receipt and determination, it 
shall be the duty of the secretary to cause notice to be given to the stockholders 
entitled to vote at such meeting, in the manner set forth in Section 2.4 hereof, 
that a meeting will be held at the time and place so determined.287 
The Chancery Court found that this bylaw amendment addressed the 
ambiguity in the original provisions.288  The amendment explicitly made the 
Quickturn board responsible for “fixing the time, place, record date and notice 
of the special meeting,” and mandated a delay of a period of ninety to one 
hundred days for a shareholder-requested special shareholders’ meeting to 
elect directors.289  The special delay period was chosen to match the “advance 
notice” provisions contained in the bylaws and was not arbitrarily set by the 
board for the sole purpose of precluding a takeover.290 
Applying the Unocal/Unitrin and Blasius tests to the specific facts, the 
court concluded that the board’s adoption of the bylaw amendment did not 
violate the principles embodied in Unocal and its progeny.291  The court also 
noted that a longer delay period would have been more suspicious and likely 
would have been struck down.292 
In sum, adopting a bylaw amendment such as the one in Quickturn is 
normally within a board’s statutory power to manage the business and affairs 
of the corporation.  An amendment will be upheld so long as it is reasonable in 
 
 286. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 287. Mentor, 728 A.2d at 38-39 (emphasis added). 
 288. Id. at 39. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 39-43. 
 292. Mentor, 728 A.2d at 42-43. 
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relation to a reasonably perceived threat.  Such an amendment has a big 
advantage, that is, the board normally can adopt it by unilateral action, without 
shareholders’ approval.  Also, it can be implemented quickly in the face of a 
hostile offer.  This is virtually the same advantage that the poison pill has over 
other defensive measures.  In the meantime, the delay of a special 
shareholders’ meeting buys the target board time to explore alternatives. 
D. Aftermath of Invacare and AMP for Non-Delaware Corporations 
In Invacare and AMP, Georgia and Pennsylvania courts authorized the 
adoption of the dead hand provision in different forms.293  Under these two 
state statutes, the dead hand provision, particularly one of limited duration, is 
not per se invalid.  Georgia and Pennsylvania corporations may continue to 
adopt the dead hand provision in their poison pills as an effective defensive 
measure. 
Although Georgia and Pennsylvania are not deemed as preeminent as 
Delaware in the area of corporate jurisprudence, the decisions of their courts 
should not and must not be underestimated.  Indeed, not every state follows 
Delaware.  Some state legislatures, similar to Georgia’s legislature, have 
deliberately amended their corporate statutes and adopted provisions regarding 
a board’s discretion to fix the terms and conditions of a poison pill.  For 
example, such amendments were made to the Missouri corporate statute 
recently. 
On April 26, 1999, both Houses of the Missouri Legislature passed a bill 
adopting the amendments discussed below to section 351.182.294  In July 1999, 
the Missouri Governor signed the bill into law.  The amendments became 
effective on August 28, 1999. 
The previous section 351.182 of the Missouri General and Business 
Corporations Law provided virtually identical provisions to those of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law.295  Specifically, if the dead hand or no 
 
 293. See supra Parts III.B, III.D. 
 294. S. 278, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 1999). 
 295. Section 157 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides the following: 
Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every corporation may create 
and issue, whether or not in connection with the issue and sale of any shares of stock or 
other securities of the corporation, rights or options entitling the holders thereof to 
purchase from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any class or classes, such 
rights or options to be evidenced by or in such instrument or instruments as shall be 
approved by the board of directors. 
The terms upon which, including the time or times which may be limited or unlimited in 
duration, at or within which, and the price or prices at which any such shares may be 
purchased from the corporation upon the exercise of any such right or option, shall be 
such as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation, or in a resolution adopted by the 
board of directors providing for the creation and issue of such rights or options, and, in 
every case, shall be set forth or incorporated by reference in the instrument or instruments 
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hand provision in a poison pill had been challenged under Missouri law, the 
Missouri courts probably would have reached the same result as the Delaware 
courts.  With the recent amendment, however, this conclusion is likely to 
change.  The current section 351.182 now reads as follows: 
Subject to any provisions in the articles of incorporation, every corporation 
may create and issue, whether or not in connection with the issue and sale of 
any shares of stock or other securities of the corporation, rights or options 
entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the corporation any shares of its 
capital stock of any class or classes, such rights or options to be evidenced by 
or in such instrument or instruments as is approved by the board of directors.  
If at the time the corporation issues rights or options, there is insufficient 
authorized and unissued shares to provide the shares needed if and when the 
rights or options are exercised, the granting of the rights or options shall not 
be invalid solely by reason of the lack of sufficient authorized but unissued 
shares. 
The terms upon which[, including the time or times which may be limited or 
unlimited in duration, at or within which, and the price or prices at which] any 
such shares may be purchased from the corporation upon the exercise of any 
such right or option, shall be [such] as [is] stated in the articles of 
incorporation, or in a resolution adopted by the board of directors providing for 
the creation and issue of such rights or options, and, in every case, shall be set 
forth or incorporated by reference in the instrument or instruments evidencing 
such rights or options.  Such terms may include, but not limited to: 
  (1)The duration of such rights and options, which may be limited or 
unlimited; 
  (2)The price or prices at which any such shares may be purchased from 
the corporation upon the exercise of any such right or option; 
  (3)The holders by whom such rights or options may be exercised; 
  (4)The conditions to or which may preclude or limit the exercise, transfer 
or receipt of such rights or options, or which may invalidate or void such 
rights or options, including without limitation conditions based upon a 
specified number or percentage of outstanding shares, rights, options, 
 
evidencing such rights or options.  In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the 
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options 
and the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive.  In case the shares of stock of the 
corporation to be issued upon the exercise of such rights or options shall be shares having 
a par value, the price or prices so to be received therefor shall not be less than the par 
value thereof.  In case the shares of stock so to be issued shall be shares of stock without 
par value, the consideration therefor shall be determined in the manner provided in section 
153 of this title. 
DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1997). 
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convertible securities, or obligations of the corporation as to which any person 
or persons or their transferees own or offer to acquire; and 
  (5)The conditions upon which such rights or options may be redeemed. 
Such terms may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside the 
documents evidencing the rights, or the resolution providing for the issue of 
the rights or options adopted by the board of directors, if the manner in which 
the facts shall operate upon the exercise of the rights or options is clearly and 
expressly set forth in the document evidencing the rights or options, or in the 
resolution. 
In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors 
as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options and the 
sufficiency thereof and the terms of such rights or options shall be conclusive.  
In case the shares of stock of the corporation to be issued upon the exercise of 
such rights or options shall be shares having a par value, the price or prices so 
to be received therefor shall not be less than the par value thereof.  In case the 
shares of stock so to be issued shall be shares of stock without par value, the 
consideration therefor shall be determined in the manner provided in section 
351.185.  Nothing contained in subsection 1 of section 351.180 shall be 
deemed to limit the authority of the board of directors to determine, in its sole 
discretion, the terms of the rights or options issuable pursuant to this 
section.296 
The amended section 351.182 is based on the Georgia statute, where the 
court upheld the dead hand poison pill in Invacare.  These amendments 
provide the board of a Missouri corporation broader latitude, that is, sole 
discretion, to fix the terms and conditions of a poison pill.  If dead hand 
provisions were challenged under new section 351.182, the Missouri courts 
would likely follow Georgia’s lead and uphold its validity.  One commentator 
recently noted: “Interestingly, a large number of states, following different 
recent judicial precedent, may now offer greater protection for companies than 
Delaware, at least in the area of rights plans.”297 
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that in AMP the court particularly 
emphasized the limited duration of the no hand feature of the poison pill 
challenged therein.298  Therefore, even under Pennsylvania law, arguably the 
strongest set of anti-takeover statutes in the nation,299 the pure dead hand 
provision may not survive judicial scrutiny.  Companies incorporated in states 
with statutes similar to those of Pennsylvania might find it prudent to follow 
Toll Brothers and Quickturn.  If the state statutes permit the adoption of a 
 
 296. S. 278, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 1999) (amended portion in italics). 
 297. Paul T. Schnell, From the Editor: 1998 in Review, M&A LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 2. 
 298. AMP, 1998 WL 778348, at *8. 
 299. WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER, Client Memorandum: Pennsylvania Federal Court 
Upholds Validity of Controversial Poison Pill on October 8, 1998, Oct. 14, 1998, at 4. 
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staggered board, companies should seriously consider doing so even if they do 
not face an immediate threat or an actual hostile bid.  Among other 
alternatives, companies may also consider (1) amending their charters to place 
limitations on shareholder ability to remove directors, (2) requiring advance 
notice for shareholders to call for a special shareholders’ meeting, (3) 
eliminating the right of shareholders to call special meetings, or (4) eliminating 
consent solicitation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Takeover activities during the last two decades have introduced us to 
innovative takeover tactics and novel defensive measures.  Likewise, the legal 
standard governing the use of various defensive measures has also evolved.  As 
Justice Moore noted in Unocal, “our corporate law is not static.  It must grow 
and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and 
needs.”300  This is evidenced by the enhanced business judgment rule and its 
application to the review of a target board’s anti-takeover defensive measures, 
including the poison pill. 
The controversy over the latest variations of the poison pill, i.e., the 
validity of dead hand provisions, centers on the fundamentals of our corporate 
jurisprudence and the interpretation of different states’ statutory provisions.  
On one hand, shareholders have the right and authority to choose the ultimate 
destiny of the corporation.  On the other hand, the board of directors has the 
statutory power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.  How do 
we strike a balance between the two?  How do we treat the powers of 
incumbent and future boards? 
Dead hand provisions in poison pills are invalid under Delaware and New 
York law because they restrict the power of the future board in the absence of 
an authorization in the corporation’s charter.  This is in direct violation of the 
statutory provisions under the laws of these two states.  After Toll Brothers and 
Quickturn, corporate lawyers and scholars cannot help wondering: “What type 
of rights plans will Delaware companies adopt following the Toll Brothers and 
Quickturn decisions?  Will hostile takeovers increase?  Will Delaware 
companies look to reincorporate in Pennsylvania or other states that permit 
more favorable rights plans?  Will the Delaware legislature take action to 
address this threat?”301  Will we see an increased number of Delaware 
corporations amending their charters to adopt a staggered board or amending 
their bylaws to require advance notice for shareholders to call special 
meetings? 
In the meantime, dead hand provisions are not per se invalid everywhere in 
the United States.  Corporations incorporated in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and 
 
 300. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985). 
 301. Schnell, supra note 297, at 2. 
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other states that have similar statutes may continue to be able to employ the 
dead hand pill, particularly the no hand poison pill, as an effective defensive 
measure.  Nonetheless, it may still be desirable for these corporations to also 
have a staggered board in its anti-takeover defensive measures arsenal. 
As the sophistication of both raiders and targets develops, corresponding 
defensive measures will change to “counter such ever mounting threats.”302  
The author of this comment believes that the unavailability of the dead hand 
poison pill to Delaware corporations will inspire more innovative mutations of 
the poison pill and perhaps additional alternative anti-takeover measures.  In 
turn, our corporate law will grow and develop to address ever-evolving 
corporate concepts and needs. 
XUEQING LINDA JI 
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